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Monetary revolution in the making

Crypto may unintentionally create economists’ dream banking system

“Banking was conceived in iniquity and was born in sin…Take away from them the power to create money and all the great fortunes…would disappear…But, if you wish to remain the slaves of bankers and pay the cost of your own slavery, let them continue to create money.” – Josiah Stamp

We may be on the verge of a revolution in monetary economics and finance that is the century-long dream of many prominent economists. Now, financial innovation is laying the foundation for their dream just as the US political economy is shifting to support it. This revolution, if it proceeds, has major implications for global finance, economic development, and geopolitics, and will create many winners and losers. The financial insurrection I’m referring to is a shift to “narrow banking” built on stablecoins. If those are unfamiliar concepts to you, let me review 800 years of financial innovation in 500 words.

The origins of fractional reserve banking

Our current financial system is built on the concept of fractional-reserve banking. In the 13th and 14th centuries, Italian money-changers-cum-bankers began to figure out that because depositors rarely demand their money back at the same time, they could hold only a fraction of the coin needed to back their deposits.11 Not only was this more profitable but it also facilitated payments across great distances: rather than send gold coins over dangerous roads, a Medici in Florence needed only sent a letter to his agent in Venice instructing him to debit one account and credit another.

Though highly profitable and effective for payments in normal circumstances, fractional reserve banking has a downside. Its inherent leverage makes the system unstable. A downturn in the economy might cause more depositors to withdraw savings at once, or worse, generate rumors that the loans backing banks’ deposits are going to default, causing a “run” on the bank. A bank unable to meet its depositors’ demands collapses into bankruptcy. But more than just depositors’ wealth is lost when banks fail in a fractional reserve system. Because banks both generate credit and facilitate payment, economic activity is severely constricted when banks fail since payments for goods and services are impaired and lending isn’t available for new investment.

Governments attempt to fix the problems

Over the centuries, as banks became simultaneously more leveraged and more critical to economic functioning, governments stepped in to try to reduce the risks of banking crises. In 1668, Sweden chartered the first central bank, the Riksbank, to lend to other banks experiencing runs. The Bank of England followed 26 years later. While that helped solve liquidity problems (banks with good assets but insufficient cash), it didn’t stop solvency crises (banks with bad loans). The US created deposit insurance in 1933 to help stop solvency-based bank runs,22 but as illustrated by the many banking crises since, including the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, neither deposit insurance nor bank capital regulations solved fractional reserve banking’s endemic fragility. Government intervention only reduced the frequency of crises and shifted their costs from depositors to taxpayers.

Economists build a better mousetrap

Around the time that the Roosevelt Administration was introducing deposit insurance, some of the era’s top names in Economics at the University of Chicago were hatching a different solution: the so-called Chicago Plan, or “narrow banking.”33 During the US savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and ‘90s the idea had a resurgence among economists.44 I was first introduced to narrow banking around that time in a Money and Banking class taught by my undergraduate thesis advisor, Roger Craine.55 (I wrote my thesis on the hidden dangers to banks of nationalizing a localized US mortgage market through securitization; too bad only Roger read it.)

Narrow banking solves the central problem of fractional reserve banking by separating the critical functions of payments and money creation from credit creation. If you studied economics, you may have been taught that central banks create money. But that’s not true in a fractional reserve system: banks do. Central banks manage the rate at which banks manufacture money (by controlling their access to reserves), but money is created by banks whenever they lend money, magically generating corresponding deposits in the process. This system – and its chaotic unwind – ties money growth to credit growth, and through banks’ network effects, to payments.

Splitting banks in two

The Chicago Plan separates the critical functions of money creation and payments from credit by splitting banking functions into two. “Narrow” banks that accept deposits and facilitate payments are required to back their deposits one for one with safe instruments like T-bills or central bank reserves. Think of them as a money market fund with a debit card. Lending is done by “broad” or “merchant” banks that fund themselves with equity capital or long-term bonds, hence aren’t subject to runs.

This segmentation of banking makes each function safe from the others. Deposit runs are eliminated because they are fully backed by high-quality assets (as well as access to the central bank). Since narrow banks facilitate payments, their safety removes the risk to the payments system. Because money is no longer created by credit creation, bad lending decisions at merchant banks don’t affect the money supply, deposits, or payments. Conversely, neither natural fluctuations in the economy’s demand for money – booms or recessions – nor concerns over loan quality affect merchant banks’ lending because it is funded with long-term debt and equity.

But why didn’t we adopt this wonderful solution?

You may be asking yourself now, “If narrow banking is so wonderful, why don’t we have it today?” The answer is twofold: the transition is painful and there has never been a political economy to support legislation to make the change.

Because narrow banking requires 100% backing of deposits by either T-bills or central bank reserves, the transition to narrow banking would require existing banks to either call in their loans, shrinking the money supply dramatically, or if they could find non-bank buyers, sell off their loan portfolios to buy short-term government paper. Both would precipitate a massive credit crunch, and the former would create liquidity shortages and payments problems.

As to the political economy, fractional reserve banking is extremely profitable – “a license to steal” as my father calls it (admiringly) – and generates a lot of jobs. Economists, in contrast, are a small group who are themselves questionably employed. As anyone in Washington, DC will tell you, the American Bankers Association (ABA) is among the most powerful lobbies in town. The same play with different actors runs in London, Brussels, Zürich, Tokyo, et cetera. Hence the continuance of fractional reserve banking is not a banking conspiracy; it’s just been good politics and cautious economics.

Financial innovation meets shifting politics

Yet, that may no longer be so. Both the costs of transition and the political economy have changed, particularly in the US. Developments in decentralized finance – aka “DeFi” or “crypto” – and the coincident evolution of the US political economy, national interests, and financial structure have generated conditions that make a shift to narrow banking in America not only feasible, but increasingly likely in my view.

Stablecoins to the rescue!

Let’s start with the critical DeFi development: the rapid growth of stablecoins. Stablecoins are decentralized “digital dollars” (or euros, yen, et cetera). Unlike central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) that are issued, cleared, and settled centrally by central banks, stablecoins are privately created “digital tokens” (electronic records). Like cryptocurrencies, ownership and transactions are stored and cleared through blockchain technology on distributed ledgers (decentralized registries). The combination of blockchain immutability and universally replicated registries facilitates trust between unknown parties without a government guarantee.

Stablecoins differ from cryptocurrencies in that they are pegged to fiat currencies, gold, or other stores of value that are more “stable” than Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies. They were designed to be on- and off-ramps between the traditional world of fiat money and the blockchain-based world of DeFi and cryptocurrencies, and to provide a steady “on-blockchain” unit of account to facilitate DeFi trading. But stablecoins’ use case has evolved significantly amid spectacular growth in acceptance and usage. Stablecoin annual transaction volumes through March totaled $35 trillion, more than doubling the prior 12-month period, while users have increased more than 50% to over 30 million, and the outstanding value of stablecoins has hit $250 billion.66

Over 90% of stablecoin transactions still involve either on/off-ramping or DeFi trading, but an increasing share of transaction growth involves “real world” uses.77 Person-to-person and business transactions in countries with unstable local currencies, like Argentina, Nigeria and Venezuela, have been a key source of growth, but one of the largest has been increasing use in global remittances by migrant labor, over a quarter of the total according to one estimate.88

With Congressional backing

Stablecoins’ increasingly rapid acceptance and growth as an alternative payments system is coming just as the Trump Administration and the US Congress are moving to institutionalize them. The Trump Administration is vocally proclaiming its desire to be a “world leader” in DeFi. Concurrently, two bills are moving through the House of Representatives (the STABLE Act) and the Senate (the GENIUS Act) that would establish regulatory approval for stablecoins provided they meet certain criteria related to maintaining their value versus a currency like the US dollar and protecting depositors.

How do stablecoins maintain their value versus a particular currency like the dollar? In theory each stablecoin unit is backed one for one with the currency it is pegged to.99 In practice, this hasn’t always been the case.1010 But the US legislation: defines what are acceptable high-quality liquid assets (HQLA); mandates one-for-one backing; and requires regular audits to establish compliance. Thus, the US Congress is creating the legal basis for entities that (1) take deposits; (2) are required to fully back deposits by HQLA; and (3) facilitate payments in the economy.

Déjà vu?

Hmmm…does that sound familiar to you? Isn’t that a narrow bank?

There are a few missing pieces. Most notably that neither the GENIUS nor STABLE Acts grant stablecoin issuers access to the Federal Reserve and neither Act defines stablecoins as money for tax purposes.1111 The omission of access to the Fed likely reflects both necessary prudence to avoid undermining the fractional reserve banking system (too quickly) with a direct competitor and the ABA’s lobbying efforts to protect banks’ monopoly. But even here there are intriguing breadcrumbs that hint banks’ protection may be temporary and only long enough to transition to a narrow banking model: among the approved HQLA for stablecoin issuers in both bills are reserves at the Federal Reserve, currently accessible only by banks.1212 I should also note that I’m not the only person thinking this: hats off to Charles Calomiris at Columbia University for seeing stablecoins as a narrow-banking future as early as 2020 (and to Kathleen Hays for bringing it to my attention before I published this).1313

Shifting political sands

Both the Trump campaign’s pivot to crypto last year and bipartisan Congressional support to normalize stablecoins reflect a profound shift in America’s domestic political economy and its sense of national interests. Bipartisan populist anger at banks and their relationship with Washington hasn’t dissipated since the Global Financial Crisis. The Fed’s QE and recent inflationary policy errors have only increased populist fury. This is just as much a part of the crypto phenomenon as FOMO.

But crypto also has generated immense new wealth and opportunities for business, creating a well financed rival to the ABA. Even institutional asset managers now are diverging from their traditional allies in banking, salivating at the opportunities they see in DeFi. The combination of popular base and economic muscle is creating, for the first time, a political economy supportive of narrow banking.

Coincide in national interests

Further, the US now has compelling national interests in developing stablecoins. The first is the one that I described earlier this year at Thematic Markets in Leitmotif 8: The geopolitics of crypto (payments): in a world where China (and other US rivals) increasingly seek to displace US payment systems like SWIFT with their own, an independent, third-party payment system that prevents countries from being “trapped” in a Chinese payments system is appealing. The other national interest is the one that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent keeps mentioning: a systemic shift towards stablecoin-based narrow banking creates “one of the largest buyers of US T-bills.”

And the new financial architecture

Finally, the financial structure of the US has become far more conducive to a non-disruptive transition relative to any time in its history, or relative to other countries today, giving the US an advantage over rivals. While the US has long been less bank dependent for credit than other major economies due to its greater use of corporate bond markets and securitized mortgages, the growth of so-called “shadow” banking in the last two decades has made it even more so. Bank credit in the US is little more than a third of total credit to the private nonfinancial sector. The rest is provided by bond markets and the shadow sector that are in fact the broad or merchant banks envisioned under the Chicago Plan.

To deliver a revolution in finance

The economic, geopolitical and financial implications of a shift to stablecoin-based narrow banking in the United States are huge. It would create significant winners and losers both within the US and around the world. Subscribers to Thematic Markets can read about those effects in my new research, Revolutionary money & banking, publishing Wednesday.

Comment

1

There is evidence of fractionally backed paper money in Song China in the eleventh century but not true banking. The earliest examples of what we can consider fractional reserve banking originate in late Medieval/early Renaissance Italy. See Money Changes Everything, William Goetzmann, Princeton University Press, 2016.

2

The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, established in 1933, was the first national deposit insurance scheme in the world, but New York State originated concept over a century earlier in 1829.

3

In 1933-’34 Irving Fisher, Frank Knight and Henry Simons of the University of Chicago laid out the designs for a narrow banking system building on the earlier work of Frederick Soddy, a radiochemist dabbling in monetary economics in the mid-1920s. See 100% Money, Irving Fisher, Adelphi, 1935; and A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire: Some Proposals for a Liberal Economic Policy, Henry C. Simons, University of Chicago Press, 1934.

4

See for instance “The Case for Narrow Banking,” James Tobin, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 67, no. 2, May 1985; Narrow Banking, Philip Booth (ed.), Institute of Economic Affairs, 1994; and footnote 5. There also was a resurgence after the Global Financial Crisis, e.g. Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation., John Kay, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, 2009; “Narrow Banking,” GeorgePennacchi, Annual Review of Financial Economics, vol. 4, no. 1, 2012; “The Chicago Plan Revisited,” Jaromir Benes & Michael Kumhof, IMF Working Paper 12/202, August 2012; and “Toward a Run‑Free Financial System,” John H. Cochrane, In Across the Great Divide: New Perspectives on the Financial Crisis, Hoover Press, 2014.

5

One of the required texts for the course remains one of the books on narrow banking: What Should Banks Do?Robert E. Litan, Brookings Institution, 1987.

6

“How stablecoins are entering the financial mainstream,” Philip Stafford, Financial Times, 12 June 2025; and “Annual Transaction Volume In Stablecoins Reaches $35 trillion,” Emir Abyazov, coinpaper, 19 March 2025.

7

“Stablecoins, Five killer tests to gauge their potential,” Kunal Jhanji et alia, Boston Consulting Group (white paper), May 2025.

8

“From adoption to continuance: Stablecoins in cross-border remittances and the role of digital and financial literacy,” Lennart Ante, Telematics and Informatics, vol. 97, February 2025.

9

Technically, the stablecoins that I am describing are “fiat-backed” stablecoins, i.e. stablecoins backed one for one by fiat currency assets. But there also are “algorithmic” stablecoins, that attempt to back their peg to fiat currencies via algorithm, i.e. smart contracts that automatically buy or sell fiat currency to stabilize their value. Since the failure of the algorithmic stablecoin TerraUSD, however, most have fallen by the wayside.

10

“After Huobi Delisting Stablecoin HUSD Falls 72% From Dollar Peg,” Oliver Knight, CoinDesk, 9 May 2023.

11

“Stablecoins should be treated as currency,” Linda Jeng, Financial Times (Opinion), 7 May 2025.

12

Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan banks also have access to reserves at the Fed.

13

See “Chartering the FinTech Future,” Charles W. Calomiris, OCC Discussion Paper, December 2020; and “How Stablecoins Will Transform Banking,” Charles W. Calomiris, Hoover Institution (public lecture powerpoint), 9 May 2025.

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Economic and market forecasts:

Economic & market forecasts
  • Sustained higher US rates, vulnerability of backend rates and term premia to steepening in H2 2023: Are we there yet?

  • No recession, continued strength of US economy throughout 2023: Solved: Drivers of the dollar cycle; Clash of the Themes; Are we there yet?; Opportunity knocks: Are you listening?; Götterdämmerung.

  • No backtracking or “pivot” by the Fed in 2023: Solved: Drivers of the dollar cycle; Clash of the Themes; Are we there yet?; Opportunity knocks: Are you listening?; Götterdämmerung.

  • No banking crisis or reversal by the Fed following the failures of Silicon Valley Bank: Did QE cause bank failures? Opportunity knocks: Are you listening?

  • No new “Plaza Accord” resulting from US dollar strength and Fed rate hikes in 2022: Plaza 2.0 bid, not offered.

  • No default by Nigeria before or in the aftermath of the 2023 national elections: Debt reality versus perceptions.

  • The continued fall in US real rates through the 2000s and early 2010s. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the associated $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere undermined the marginal product of capital in the US while simultaneously increasing non-US demand for US Treasuries.

  • Emerging market outperformance in the 2000s. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) drove both the development of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere and the commodity supercycle, while Apex neoliberalism supported institutional reforms that lowered EM risk premia, all of which encouraged foreign direct investment that raised productivity and led to rapid economic growth.

  • The end of emerging markets’ “original sin” and growth of EM local bond markets, a development supported by a G7 initiative that I led at the US Treasury. Themes & framework: The $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere provided a new stability in many EM exchange rates while institutional reforms undertaken by many as part of Apex neoliberalism lowered EM risk premia.

  • The Global Financial Crisis (albeit see admission of errors below). Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere simultaneously increased incentives for debt finance in the US (as demand for “safe” USD bonds rose globally) while undermining US means of repayment as the US marginal product of capital in traded goods fell. Combined with poorly designed bank regulation that allowed banks to leverage themselves well beyond regulators’ intent (Apex neoliberalism), “complexity cascaded”.

  • The failure of QE to generate post-GFC inflation. Themes & framework: Believing is being: inflation expectations were stable to falling amid deleveraging and associated lethargic income growth, lowering real interest rates as nominal rates were pinned at the zero lower bound, and implying sustained weak money demand. Stuffing banks with more reserves changed none of those variables. As Keynes described seven decades earlier – in the absence of negative nominal rates – monetary policy at the zero lower bound is equivalent to “pushing on a string”.

  • The lack of effect of balance sheet runoff on interest rates. Themes & framework: Believing is being and portfolio theory rejected the then dominant “portfolio balance” theory of QE. QE was a credible commitment by central banks to keep rates on hold, suppressing expectations for future rates and thus the yield curve. This is why the “Taper Tantrum” had its largest effects on 3-5 year forward rates as expectations for rates hiked rose, while long-dated forward rates fell. Measures of long-dated term premia continued to fall as the Fed reduced its balance sheet.

  • Peak Chinese growth in 2011. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) led to unsustainable contributions of investment to GDP and a collapse in China’s marginal product of capital amid historically large debt to GDP, a phenomenon that peaked with China’s 50% surge in domestic credit in response to the GFC. Domestic funding of its debt trapped China within its own financial repression scheme, frustrating its efforts to unwind its $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere and internationalization the renminbi as a closed capital account is required to avoid savings flight and a collapse of the debt bubble. This self-funded debt bubble implies that losses from consequent overinvestment are “amortized” in the form of slower growth.

  • Emerging Market underperformance of the last decade (and likely future decade). Themes & framework: Institutional reform in EM peaked with US policy credibility before the GFC under Apex neoliberalism; China’s peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) in 2011 and the associated end of the commodity supercycle ended the “pack” economic benefits of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere, while simultaneously the advent of Localization began to shift production back to advanced economies. Amid stagnating growth and backsliding reforms, EM FX and asset prices looked (and continue to look) overvalued and risk spreads remain too thin.

  • Falling USD reserve share in the 2000s and a rising share since peak China. Themes & framework: The massive reserve accumulation required to sustain undervalution of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere came to be seen as “sovereign wealth” that required diversification, rather than a liquidity store for crises, and led to a consequent fall in the USD share of reserves. Yet the greater financial openness and cross-border claims that accompanied the Apex neoliberalism necessarily implied a proportional increase in capital outflows in periods of risk aversion; i.e. historically large reserves were not as large as perceived in reality. As China and the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere slowed after 2011, and Global entropy increased Uncertainty with attendant effects on risk aversion, emerging markets learned painfully in 2014 that reserves were neither excess nor sovereign wealth, but instead necessary liquidity, and that the USD’s safe haven properties were unparalleled.

  • Low and falling inflation throughout the 2010s. Themes & framework: Missingflation, the unexplained trend component of global inflation that had led to two decades of inflation overforecasting by economists, showed no signs of abating and seemed to be caused by a continued slide in inflation expectations (Believing is being) as central banks struggled with the zero lower bound. The end of the trend would require both for central banks to make more credible commitment to raise inflation in conjunction with a sustained positive inflation shock.

  • The (trend) bottoming of long-term US real rates, higher-than-expected peak in Fed funds rates and US equity outperformance in the last decade. Themes & framework: China’s peak in 2011 under Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the dissolution of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere ended the trend of falling US real rates they had created. But it wasn’t until Localization gathered sufficient steam – and the US private sector had deleveraged – that US openness and technological leadership sufficiently raised US returns to capital to support a rise in US real rates. The Trump administration’s political support (Politics of Rage) for Localization gave another nudge to US relative returns to capital, and Covid again accelerated these phenomena further (and likely more sustainably).

  • The capitulation of Saudi Arabia’s price leadership/management in 2014 in the face of surging US tight oil production leading to lower and more volatile crude oil prices. Themes & framework: The end of the commodity supercycle brought about by peak China under Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) paused relentless crude oil demand growth, allowing innovation and a business-friendly US regime to undermined Saudi Arabia’s price leadership with tight oil production. Cartel dynamics combined with Saudi Arabia’s long-run price maximization led to a collapse in Saudi-enforced OPEC discipline, and lower, more volatile crude oil prices.

  • Financial volatility’s shift to a lower median level with more frequent, shorter explosions during the last decade. Themes & framework: Rising Uncertainty in politics (Politics of Rage), geopolitics (Global entropy), technology (Localization), and policy (Missingflation) amid Complexity cascades shifted the relative shares of total risk away from quantifiable sources towards unquantifiable sources; the counter-intuitive implication of rising uncertainty is lower median volatility as active risk taking retreats in information lulls, with violent explosions of price activity when new information is revealed.

  • Persistence of post-Covid supply constraints and sustainable inflation supported by rearview-mirror central bank policies leading to a flip in the direction of Missingflation. Themes & framework: Covid simultaneously accelerated both the economic and political motivations for Localization, caused a permanent shift in the structure of global demand, and disrupted existing global supply chains. Short-run aggregate supply could not adjust to the jump in investment and shift in demand quickly enough, creating prolonged shortages and the need for prices to curtail demand. The associated cost-push inflation was all the spark needed to ignite Believing is being changes in inflation expectation driven by central banks’ backward-looking policies based on a lack of understanding of Missingflation.

  • The Fed’s post-Covid rate cycle would be more like 1994 than the post-2000 gradualist cycles (a call I made in early 2021). Themes & framework: The intent of the Fed’s FAIT policy always was to boost long-run inflation expectations by falling “behind the curve” on inflation. Yet their lack of understanding of the causes of Missingflation and insufficient faith in their own ability to generate Believing is being kept them focused on “fighting the last war” too long, allowing inflation to run too hot, too quickly. But contrary to market conventional wisdom, inflation is deeply politically unpopular in an aging society and no central banker wants to be remembered as failing to control inflation. Accordingly, the Fed (eventually) will react forcefully to contain the Believing is being genie they underestimated.

  • Consistent underperformance of European economy, assets and the euro since the Global Financial Crisis. Themes & framework: Relative to trend growth, Europe was more highly indebted than the US, yet European policymakers too long considered the GFC an “American problem”. Combined with Europe’s greater institutional rigidities and a reluctance to write down bad assets, it would take proportionately longer to achieve necessary deleveraging. China’s 2011 peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the rise of Localization undermined all parts of Europe: the globalization-dependent South and China-dependent North, while inflexibility and low levels of technological innovation inhibit Europe’s ability to adjust to the new global economic order.

  • UK outperformance of consensus Brexit forecasts. Themes & framework: Consensus forecast for post-Brexit UK were based on three flawed assumptions (due to underappreciation of themes!). First, by ignoring emergent Localization, growth forecasts grounded in Apex neoliberalism wrongly assumed globalization would continue to be a major driver of economic growth. Second, the consensus failed to acknowledge the UK’s long-run structural competitiveness: world-leading universities providing a technological edge in Localization; and strong, enduring institutions offering safety and stability amid Global entropy and rising Uncertainty. Third, the consensus, ironically, ignored the largest driver of trade (by a wide margin) in their own models: “gravity”, or proximity to trading partners. Network effects are extraordinarily powerful in trade and difficult to overcome.

  • Importance and implications for markets of Scottish independence referendum in 2014. Themes & framework: As one of the earliest manifestations of the Politics of Rage and its demands for greater political representation, the Scottish referendum was an unanticipated shock to markets and one of the first signs of Global entropy and the Uncertainty to come.

Global entropy

Manifest and growing disorder

By ignoring the endogeneity of complex systems and Rodrick’s globalization trilemma – that democracy, national self-determination, and economic globalization cannot enduringly coexist – Apex neoliberalism sowed the seeds of its own demise, leading to today’s manifest and growing global disorder: the end of Post-World War II international rules, rising ethnonationalism, multipolarity, the Politics of Rage, and the unwinding of globalized supply chains. In short, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations trumped Fukuyama’s End of History. Apex neoliberalism facilitated rising trade-to-income ratios, cross-border capital flows, intergovernmental cooperation, and intra-economy income inequality; while simultaneously lowering financial spreads, inter-economy income inequality, and inter-state warfare. Global entropy likely will reverse many of these effects.

Missingflation

Economists don’t understand inflation

What are economists missing about inflation? In the two decades before Covid, market analysts, academic economists and central banks consistently overforecast inflation; in the last two years they have persistently underforecast it. Enduring one-way errors are not “white noise”; they demonstrate bias and strongly suggest that economists’ current understanding of inflation is flawed. Demographics, globalization and technology help to explain some of the forecast miss, but significant omitted variable bias remains, most likely due to failure to explicitly incorporate Believing is being.

Believing is being

Self-fulfilling beliefs are real

Beliefs drive everything from asset bubbles, to debt dynamics, to crypto currencies’ values, to inflation and hyperinflations (probably Missingflation, too). Good economists understand this but often omit beliefs from models to simplify because of the difficulty in measuring beliefs. Unfortunately, too many bad economists copy those models without understanding the potential for omitted variable bias. The rapid social, technological, political, and geopolitical changes behind Global entropy and Uncertainty are swiftly shifting beliefs, driving a feedback loop of economic and political outcomes. Yet the infrequency of these deviations and difficulty in measuring them make statistical modeling nearly impossible. Only through economic theory and full-spectrum information collection can we infer when and how beliefs are adjusting and their likely effects.

Complexity cascades

Complex systems fail unpredictably

Human societies, nation states and (especially) economies are examples of complex systems. Complex systems always operate in “broken” mode and ironically are more structurally stable when they have lots of small failures. But when they are subjected to massive or cascading shocks, complex systems can fail unpredictably and totally. Covid and manifest Global entropy represent self-reinforcing mammoth shockwaves that imply systemic collapses – in all spheres, socio-political, geopolitical, economic, and financial – are more likely than the consensus admits.

Uncertainty

Not all risks can be quantified

All risks are not the same. Some are quantifiable, like the chance of being dealt an ace in a game of cards. Others are not but can be subjectively guessed, like the chance you leave a casino a winner. Then there is uncertainty, the most dangerous of all risks because it is by definition, non-quantifiable: what is the chance the casino gets hit by a meteor? Apex neoliberalism created a façade of quantifiable risks; Global entropy and Complexity cascades are illustrating that the world is far more uncertain. The quantitative models in finance, business, economics, and politics that gained dominance during Apex neoliberalism generally have performed poorly as Global entropy has become more pronounced, a trend that is likely to sustain as uncertainty rises further. Scenario analysis and “satisficing” are the only proven frameworks for dealing with uncertainty.

Politics of Rage

The proletariat want their franchise back

Four decades ago, globalization and increasing economic returns to intellectual capital opened a fissure between elites and everyone else, especially in more developed economies. The economic and political consequences of Apex neoliberalism widened this fissure into a chasm of mistrust that has resulted in the political turmoil that engulfed most advanced economies in the last decade. Contrary to conventional wisdom, its causes derive more from perceived and actual political disenfranchisement than economic distress and inequality. Trends in the former suggest the wave is not near cresting, implying sustained socio-political, geopolitical and economic disruptions.

$Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere

FX herding cures “fear of floating”

The “co-prosperity sphere” of bloc managed exchange rates centered around Chinese trade and the US financial system, alternatively known as Bretton Woods II or Chimerica, dramatically reoriented global supply chains, supported emerging markets’ financial development and economic boom of the 2000s, drove much of the dollar’s 2002-’11 depreciation, and ultimately likely caused the Global Financial Crisis. Emerging market crises of the late 1990s marked the final chapter in the Bretton Woods exchange rate system. Yet “Fear of floating” persisted until China’s Mercantilism and contemporaneous accession to WTO provided an alternative: exchange rates managed by “herd” or by “pack”. Hiding within the herd provided financial stability for China’s EM trading partners, while simultaneously allowing them hunt as a pack for foreign direct investment and supply-chain dominance. The size and rapid growth of the co-prosperity sphere distorted the global economy like a massive stellar object warps space-time. Collective suppression of exchange rates and domestic cost of capital diverted supply chain growth into the bloc, while attendant reserve accumulation led to a surge in demand for “safe” core economy bonds. The former undermined returns to capital in traded goods production outside the bloc and the latter depressed interest rates on “safe” US debt, encouraging overinvestment in non-traded goods like housing. (Note: I labeled this phenomenon “the dollar bloc” when I first wrote about it in 2003-04, but later referred to it as “the co-prosperity sphere”.)

Mercantilism (with Chinese Characteristics)

State capitalism’s unintended costs

China’s 1994-2012 “miracle” that lifted nearly a billion people out of poverty and its current growth problems both originate in its extreme application of the mercantilist “Asian growth model” originated by Japan and later copied by Asia’s “Tigers”. A combination of capital controls, protectionism, domestic financial repression, and industrial policy direct underpriced capital to favored industries that promote rapid capital accumulation and development by leveraging external demand (and technology) from advanced economies. Rapid development and convergence comes at cost, however. Underpriced capital and exchange rates lead to distortive overinvestment. Those losses are realized either abruptly and painfully through write downs – like those enforced on late-‘90s Asian Crisis economies by the IMF – or, if the economy can self fund, are “amortized” as lost future growth. Japan’s lost decade and China’s current funk are examples of the amortization path of economic loss.

Apex neoliberalism

Liberal capital democracy’s pyrrhic victory

Rapid global growth, particularly in the less developed world, “hyperglobalized” production and the growth of inter-governmental coordination derive substantively from the triumph of neoliberalism that followed the collapse of its ideological competitors with the Soviet Union’s fall and emerging market crises of the 1990s. But so too did the seeds of its undoing: The Politics of Rage, Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics), Missingflation, and ultimately Global entropy. Rapid adoption of Western economic institutions and trade mechanisms followed from neoliberalism’s victory, promoting a world of hyperglobalization: ever-more dispersed but integrated global supply chains, just-in-time industrial processes with reduced redundancy, unfettered cross-border capital flows, and uniform rules that increased the influence of international institutions, non-governmental organizations and multinationals at the expense of local political control and less-skilled citizenry. Resultant uniformity and coincident digitization created a façade of certainty and quantification, promoting an overreliance on quantitative methods in decision processes, risk control and forecasting.

Economic and market phenomena:

Economic & market forecasts
  • The continued fall in US real rates through the 2000s and early 2010s. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the associated $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere undermined the marginal product of capital in the US while simultaneously increasing non-US demand for US Treasuries.
  • Emerging market outperformance in the 2000s. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) drove both the development of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere and the commodity supercycle, while Apex neoliberalism supported institutional reforms that lowered EM risk premia, all of which encouraged foreign direct investment that raised productivity and led to rapid economic growth.
  • The end of emerging markets’ “original sin” and growth of EM local bond markets, a development supported by a G7 initiative that I led at the US Treasury. Themes & framework: The $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere provided a new stability in many EM exchange rates while institutional reforms undertaken by many as part of Apex neoliberalism lowered EM risk premia.
  • The Global Financial Crisis (albeit see admission of errors below). Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere simultaneously increased incentives for debt finance in the US (as demand for “safe” USD bonds rose globally) while undermining US means of repayment as the US marginal product of capital in traded goods fell. Combined with poorly designed bank regulation that allowed banks to leverage themselves well beyond regulators’ intent (Apex neoliberalism), “complexity cascaded”.
  • The failure of QE to generate post-GFC inflation. Themes & framework: Believing is being: inflation expectations were stable to falling amid deleveraging and associated lethargic income growth, lowering real interest rates as nominal rates were pinned at the zero lower bound, and implying sustained weak money demand. Stuffing banks with more reserves changed none of those variables. As Keynes described seven decades earlier – in the absence of negative nominal rates – monetary policy at the zero lower bound is equivalent to “pushing on a string”.
  • The lack of effect of balance sheet runoff on interest rates. Themes & framework: Believing is being and portfolio theory rejected the then dominant “portfolio balance” theory of QE. QE was a credible commitment by central banks to keep rates on hold, suppressing expectations for future rates and thus the yield curve. This is why the “Taper Tantrum” had its largest effects on 3-5 year forward rates as expectations for rates hiked rose, while long-dated forward rates fell. Measures of long-dated term premia continued to fall as the Fed reduced its balance sheet.
  • Peak Chinese growth in 2011. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) led to unsustainable contributions of investment to GDP and a collapse in China’s marginal product of capital amid historically large debt to GDP, a phenomenon that peaked with China’s 50% surge in domestic credit in response to the GFC. Domestic funding of its debt trapped China within its own financial repression scheme, frustrating its efforts to unwind its $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere and internationalization the renminbi as a closed capital account is required to avoid savings flight and a collapse of the debt bubble. This self-funded debt bubble implies that losses from consequent overinvestment are “amortized” in the form of slower growth.
  • Emerging Market underperformance of the last decade (and likely future decade). Themes & framework: Institutional reform in EM peaked with US policy credibility before the GFC under Apex neoliberalism; China’s peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) in 2011 and the associated end of the commodity supercycle ended the “pack” economic benefits of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere, while simultaneously the advent of Localization began to shift production back to advanced economies. Amid stagnating growth and backsliding reforms, EM FX and asset prices looked (and continue to look) overvalued and risk spreads remain too thin.
  • Falling USD reserve share in the 2000s and a rising share since peak China. Themes & framework: The massive reserve accumulation required to sustain undervalution of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere came to be seen as “sovereign wealth” that required diversification, rather than a liquidity store for crises, and led to a consequent fall in the USD share of reserves. Yet the greater financial openness and cross-border claims that accompanied the Apex neoliberalism necessarily implied a proportional increase in capital outflows in periods of risk aversion; i.e. historically large reserves were not as large as perceived in reality. As China and the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere slowed after 2011, and Global entropy increased Uncertainty with attendant effects on risk aversion, emerging markets learned painfully in 2014 that reserves were neither excess nor sovereign wealth, but instead necessary liquidity, and that the USD’s safe haven properties were unparalleled.
  • Low and falling inflation throughout the 2010s. Themes & framework: Missingflation, the unexplained trend component of global inflation that had led to two decades of inflation overforecasting by economists, showed no signs of abating and seemed to be caused by a continued slide in inflation expectations (Believing is being) as central banks struggled with the zero lower bound. The end of the trend would require both for central banks to make more credible commitment to raise inflation in conjunction with a sustained positive inflation shock.
  • The (trend) bottoming of long-term US real rates, higher-than-expected peak in Fed funds rates and US equity outperformance in the last decade. Themes & framework: China’s peak in 2011 under Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the dissolution of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere ended the trend of falling US real rates they had created. But it wasn’t until Localization gathered sufficient steam – and the US private sector had deleveraged – that US openness and technological leadership sufficiently raised US returns to capital to support a rise in US real rates. The Trump administration’s political support (Politics of Rage) for Localization gave another nudge to US relative returns to capital, and Covid again accelerated these phenomena further (and likely more sustainably).
  • The capitulation of Saudi Arabia’s price leadership/management in 2014 in the face of surging US tight oil production leading to lower and more volatile crude oil prices. Themes & framework: The end of the commodity supercycle brought about by peak China under Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) paused relentless crude oil demand growth, allowing innovation and a business-friendly US regime to undermined Saudi Arabia’s price leadership with tight oil production. Cartel dynamics combined with Saudi Arabia’s long-run price maximization led to a collapse in Saudi-enforced OPEC discipline, and lower, more volatile crude oil prices.
  • Financial volatility’s shift to a lower median level with more frequent, shorter explosions during the last decade. Themes & framework: Rising Uncertainty in politics (Politics of Rage), geopolitics (Global entropy), technology (Localization), and policy (Missingflation) amid Complexity cascades shifted the relative shares of total risk away from quantifiable sources towards unquantifiable sources; the counter-intuitive implication of rising uncertainty is lower median volatility as active risk taking retreats in information lulls, with violent explosions of price activity when new information is revealed.
  • Persistence of post-Covid supply constraints and sustainable inflation supported by rearview-mirror central bank policies leading to a flip in the direction of Missingflation. Themes & framework: Covid simultaneously accelerated both the economic and political motivations for Localization, caused a permanent shift in the structure of global demand, and disrupted existing global supply chains. Short-run aggregate supply could not adjust to the jump in investment and shift in demand quickly enough, creating prolonged shortages and the need for prices to curtail demand. The associated cost-push inflation was all the spark needed to ignite Believing is being changes in inflation expectation driven by central banks’ backward-looking policies based on a lack of understanding of Missingflation.
  • The Fed’s post-Covid rate cycle would be more like 1994 than the post-2000 gradualist cycles (a call I made in early 2021). Themes & framework: The intent of the Fed’s FAIT policy always was to boost long-run inflation expectations by falling “behind the curve” on inflation. Yet their lack of understanding of the causes of Missingflation and insufficient faith in their own ability to generate Believing is being kept them focused on “fighting the last war” too long, allowing inflation to run too hot, too quickly. But contrary to market conventional wisdom, inflation is deeply politically unpopular in an aging society and no central banker wants to be remembered as failing to control inflation. Accordingly, the Fed (eventually) will react forcefully to contain the Believing is being genie they underestimated.
  • Consistent underperformance of European economy, assets and the euro since the Global Financial Crisis. Themes & framework: Relative to trend growth, Europe was more highly indebted than the US, yet European policymakers too long considered the GFC an “American problem”. Combined with Europe’s greater institutional rigidities and a reluctance to write down bad assets, it would take proportionately longer to achieve necessary deleveraging. China’s 2011 peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the rise of Localization undermined all parts of Europe: the globalization-dependent South and China-dependent North, while inflexibility and low levels of technological innovation inhibit Europe’s ability to adjust to the new global economic order.
  • UK outperformance of consensus Brexit forecasts. Themes & framework: Consensus forecast for post-Brexit UK were based on three flawed assumptions (due to underappreciation of themes!). First, by ignoring emergent Localization, growth forecasts grounded in Apex neoliberalism wrongly assumed globalization would continue to be a major driver of economic growth. Second, the consensus failed to acknowledge the UK’s long-run structural competitiveness: world-leading universities providing a technological edge in Localization; and strong, enduring institutions offering safety and stability amid Global entropy and rising Uncertainty. Third, the consensus, ironically, ignored the largest driver of trade (by a wide margin) in their own models: “gravity”, or proximity to trading partners. Network effects are extraordinarily powerful in trade and difficult to overcome.
  • Importance and implications for markets of Scottish independence referendum in 2014. Themes & framework: As one of the earliest manifestations of the Politics of Rage and its demands for greater political representation, the Scottish referendum was an unanticipated shock to markets and one of the first signs of Global entropy and the Uncertainty to come.

Foreign exchange forecasts:

Foreign exchange forecasts
  • The dollar’s trend fall 2002-’11. Themes & framework: The effects of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere on relative returns to capital, balance of payments and the effects of “diversification” as sovereign reserves evolved into sovereign wealth.

  • The dollar’s trend turn in 2011, surge 2014-2016, and counter-consensus strength in 2018 and 2021 (I was the only sell-side analyst to forecast USD strength in 2021). Themes & framework: The same forces driving the US real rates higher in the last several years – the end of Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and its associated $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere, disproportionate benefit to the US from accelerating Localization, Global entropy and Complexity cascades, all played out in the USD, too, with added support from increased safe haven demand for the greenback due to rising Uncertainty brought about by Global entropy and Complexity cascades.

  • The euro’s plunge from $1.36 in mid 2014 to $1.05 in early 2015. Themes & framework: Reluctant deleveraging from the Global Financial Crisis combined with the sharp deterioration in European returns to capital following China’s peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the shift to Localization from globalization implied a sharply lower real value of the euro. When ECB President Draghi ruled out the deflationary (1990s Japan) path to devaluation with his commitment to “whatever it takes”, Believing is being implied an immediate and massive change in the nominal value of the euro was required as the expected path for domestic prices flipped.

  • The yen’s surge from above 120 per dollar to below 105 in H1 2016. Themes & framework: Abenomics’ biggest success was its Believing is being commitment to reflate Japan’s economy, leading to a sharp depreciation of the nominal yen as expected future deflation was unwound. But yen depreciation included an “overshoot” to compensate for the risks that inflation might overshoot. The Bank of Japan’s tacit admission that “Quantitative & Qualitative Easing” could not create sufficient inflation with its December 2015 adoption of negative interest rates implied a rapid unwind of the overshoot given the yen’s deep undervaluation as beliefs shifted again.

  • The pound sterling’s pre-EU referendum fall to $1.40, post-referendum floor near $1.20, and its post-Brexit rebound above $1.30. Themes & framework: A steep risk premium in sterling was required to compensate for the Uncertainty induced by the Politics of Rage driven jolt. Yet, 1.20 represented a 60+ year low in purchasing power parity and seemed to undervalue the UK’s long-run structural assets – strong institutions, top global universities, leading tech industry – all of which were appreciating in value in a world of Localization, Global entropy, broader Uncertainty, and rising potential for Complexity cascades.

Political forecasts:

  • Political instability in Russia and China in 2023: Clash of the Themes.

  • Brexit 2016. Themes & framework: The chasm between elites (including those in markets) and ordinary citizens over the latter’s sense of disenfranchisement, the fundamental cause of the Politics of Rage, was clear well before the referendum and strongly suggested that bias in polling turnout models could fully account for the polls’ projected margin of defeat.

  • Trump 2016. Themes & framework: Record pre-election postal votes from registered independents (for whom no party seeks to “get out the vote”) suggested that, as with Brexit, the Politics of Rage’s disenfranchised and unaccounted for voters would be sufficient to overcome the (narrow) projected margin of loss.

  • Marine Le Pen’s 2017 success in reaching the run-off but ultimate failure to win French presidency. Themes & framework: The Politics of Rage framework suggested an undercounting of both Le Pen and left-wing populists’ support, giving her a clear path to the second round. But her projected margin of loss in the general election was far too large to be due solely to turnout bias, implying no chance of second-round success, particularly with left-wing populist voters dropping out or shifting support to Macron.

  • Trump narrow loss, post-election conflict 2020. Themes & framework: Pollsters’ mistaken focus on education levels as the source of their 2016 turnout errors rather than on (mis)trust driven by the Politics of Rage implied polls still were biased. Large shifts in minority voters towards Trump and unusually high “undecided” voters late in a highly polarized election also suggested the magnitude of Trump’s outperformance would be large (indeed, it was larger than 2016). But the margin to overcome also was much wider in 2020, suggesting a close loss by Trump. Increasing polarization and mistrust on both sides implied a violent reaction by a minority, whichever side lost.

Admission of errors:

I get things wrong, too, but hopefully am the wiser for it. This list is far from complete, but represents some of the ones that both stung and taught me the most.

  • Failing to specify financial institutions as at risk from credit trauma in 2023. While I did highlight that the most predictable source of for 2023 would be credit events following the massive rise in interest rates in 2022 (Debt reality versus perceptions), I didn’t specifically identify banks and other financial institutions as especially vulnerable, which proved to be the case with the failure of a few regional US banks in March 2023. Lessons learnt: Sometimes one’s focus on the underlying causes blinds to the obvious consequences, and levered entities with broad exposure will always be at risk from any traumas within an economy, even if sector or region specific.

  • Not seeing the Global Financial Crisis sooner. I saw the GFC earlier than many, but the extent of the financial system’s capital shortfall eluded me far longer than it should have. At the US Treasury from 2006 through early 2008 I was responsible for assessing foreign financial risks (sadly, institutional territorialism prevented an integrated approach with my domestic-side colleagues that may have focused more attention on off-balance-sheet financing of US housing). I chaired meeting after meeting in 2006-‘07 with market professionals, academics, regulators, and other policymakers where a noisy minority of participants argued that historic levels of debt to GDP implied an impending crisis. Yet when I challenged them to explain a channel of transmission, what would be the tipping point, why it had not occurred already, or to present evidence that bank capital was insufficient to absorb even an historic drop in US housing prices, none – including some who have become very famous for “calling” the GFC – could do so. Ultimately, it was the behavior of banks in funding markets in mid-to-late 2007 that clued me in that banks’ capital bases might not be what they purported (or, equivalently, contingent liabilities off balance sheet were far larger than people understood). What I had not done – nor, apparently had any of the “experts” I consulted in those years – was the detailed micro-level analysis that the protagonists of The Big Short had done (kudos to them). Lessons learnt: 1. “Macro” analysis often requires “micro foundations”; 2. many people claim expertise, don’t rely on it without evidence; and 3. notwithstanding (2), even if they can’t explain it, pay attention when a gathering minority claim to smell smoke. (Implicit lesson 4: don’t assume that the left hand is talking to the right hand in any organization.)

  • Losing my nerve at the bottom of markets in 2009. My framework helped me to correctly call the bottom in credit markets in January 2009 and recommend to the distressed debt fund I then worked for that we aggressively buy leveraged loans. But on market research mission in late February, I got spooked by US Treasury and Fed officials I met in New York and Washington. Throwing my framework out the window, on 6 March 2009, the exact day the S&P 500 hit its 666 low, I wrote a memo urging the fund to sell SPX futures as a hedge on its market exposure. Lessons learnt: 1. Never abandon your framework; and 2. don’t assume someone’s position or pedigree alone gives them an informational or analytical advantage: demand reasons and evidence.

  • Missing the euro’s partial rebound in 2017; indeed, I forecast it lower! I failed to acknowledge the extent of the uptick in economic activity, and importantly, the credit growth that the ECB’s “anything it takes” policy was generating. This one stung as I was a strong believer in then-President Mario Draghi’s approach and had previously highlighted credit expansion as a key metric of success. Lessons learnt: Keep your eyes on the ball and regularly check to see if any of the ex ante conditions established for changing your mind have been met.

  • Dollar weakness in summer 2020. Another one that really stings. Having correctly forecast that Covid-induced Uncertainty would lead to a surge in the USD as everyone scrambled for high-quality assets and liquidity in March-April 2020, I then failed to incorporate the unwind of that flight to quality as risk tolerance returned once the panic subsided. Lesson learnt: Sadly, the same as 2017 dollar lesson: Keep your eyes on the ball and mind your pre-established conditions for turning points.

  • I completely missed the Fed’s mini easing cycle in 2019. While we will never know and Covid eviscerated my chance at redemption, I still believe the Fed’s easing was not merited and likely would have necessitated more aggressive hiking later had the Covid crisis not intervened. The US economy continued to grow strongly in 2019, investment held up, and while headline inflation moderated somewhat, bottlenecks were generating rapid acceleration in a number of CPI subcomponents. But even if I was right on the economy, the FOMC sets policy and I failed to listen to them, particularly the increasing support for average inflation targeting. Lessons learnt: Policymakers set policy, listen to them even if you think they’re wrong.

  • Underestimating Jeremy Corbyn in the 2017 UK general election. I expected a small Conservative victory based on then Prime Minister Theresa May’s outreach to the working class and the Labour Party’s anti-Brexit tone. What I failed to notice was that Mr. Corbyn’s grass-roots campaign cleverly focused on local bread-and-butter issues and greater political devolution, directly addressing one of the primary drivers of the Politics of Rage: a widening sense of political disenfranchisement among the average citizenry. Corbyn’s tangible policies and outreach – which he largely abandoned in his losing 2019 campaign – easily trumped Ms. May’s intangible rhetoric as “hidden” Brexit voters didn’t trust her. Lessons learnt: Again, “macro” analysis needs “micro foundations”, particularly in politics; ignore at your own peril.

  • Texas Governor Rick Perry to win the 2012 Republican nomination and beat President Barack Obama in the general election. The foundations of the Politics of Rage were already well apparent by the 2012 election and Rick Perry’s campaign was well tuned to court the rising sense of disenfranchisement of working-class voters, particularly in Appalachia, and increasing distrust of institutional expertise across voters. Many of those voters were Democrats who were disappointed with the lack of “Hope and Change” promised by President Obama, making him vulnerable to any Republican who could attract a significant number of Democratic voters. Governor Perry’s bigger challenge appeared to be winning the Republican nomination, but his solid conservative credentials and popularity in the second-largest state suggested he would eek it out. Who knew he would self-immolate in a nationally televised debate? Lessons learnt: Themes are important – Trump proved the Politics of Rage four years later – but idiosyncratic risks always are present.