Problems in Bananastan

A free version of "May you live in interesting times, American political instability"

The Hierophant Tarot card, upside down, signifies rebellion, subversiveness, new approaches

Note: This is a free version of May you live in interesting times, Leitmotif 6: American political instability, that I have made available for a broader audience at the request of some of my paid subscribers who wanted a version to forward. The original, full version, also contains economic and market analysis that has been removed from this version.

Problems in Bananastan

Have you been paying attention to the latest political drama in Bananastan? Tensions between its two main tribes, the Hooters and the Townies, are reaching the breaking point ahead of November’s presidential election. Former President Loudt, a Hooter, seeks to take back the presidency from President Dodder, a Townie, who ousted him four years ago in a close, contested election.

Former President Loudt has been a lightning rod for long-simmering tension between the two tribes. His abrasive, often caustic voicing of many deep-seated Hootie antipathies towards various Townie subgroups and customs deeply offends Townies.11 But Townie fears run much deeper. His long history of dishonesty and megalomania have raised fundamental questions about his suitability as a leader and mental stability.22 He also was dogged throughout his presidency by Townie accusations that he colluded with foreign governments to win office, accusations that he and the Hooters viewed as a witch hunt and abuse of power by Townie legislators and bureaucrats.33 More disturbingly, many Townies believe, fanned by Mr. Loudt’s provocative quips, that he disdains the rule of law and intends to impose a dictatorship through which he will take retribution in a second term.44

For their part, many Hooters see former President Loudt as merely pushing back against what they see as a systematic oppression of their culture by a Townie-dominated media and bureaucracy. Further, a large majority of Hooters believe that Mr. Loudt’s loss to Mr. Dodder resulted from electoral fraud.55 Following the election, in a vain attempt to block its certification, a Hooter mob rampaged through parliament, injuring several police officers, one of whom shot and killed a rioter.66 Hooter fears were reinforced by a gloating post-election report in a Townie-leaning magazine that a “shadow” syndicate of highly placed Townies in business, the press, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary had successfully conspired to rig the election by censoring news unfavorable to President Dodder, spreading disinformation, and by suppressing Hooter advertising and social media.77 These claims were later validated by a trove of emails and other documents published by independent journalists who were given access to a major social media company’s filesafter a Hooter business magnate bought it following the election.88

Townies, horrified by Mr. Loudt’s refusal to accept his loss and his followers’ assault on parliament, applauded when the Dodder justice ministry commenced the largest criminal prosecution in the country’s history, arresting over 1,000 Hooters, prosecuting several hundred, including one in secret, and jailing many without trial for over a year, some in solitary confinement and conditions so appalling that even leading Townies began to protest.99 Townie prosecutors in various provinces also filed charges against Mr. Loudt and several of his associates for racketeering, conspiracy, election interference, attempts to overturn the election, hush money payments, and inappropriate handling of classified government documents.1010 In a decision split along tribal lines, based on a controversial interpretation of the law, a provincial high court ruled that Mr. Loudt could not appear on the province’s ballot in this year’s election; Townies in other provinces moved to do the same.1111

Mr. Loudt and many Hooters decried these moves as politically motivated abuses of power and an attempt to undermine democracy.1212 Many Hooters have come to see jailed rioters as political prisoners.1313 In a move Townies interpreted as retribution, Hooters in parliament began an impeachment inquiry against President Dodder for corruption.1414

The increasing use of state power by both tribes against the other mirrors a sharp rise in animosity and distrust between the two tribes to historic levels. Super majorities in both tribes see the other as dishonest and amoral, each seeing themselves as the defenders of democracy and the opposing tribe as anti-democratic.1515 These beliefs are being reinforced by self-segregation as Townies and Hooters increasingly choose to live in separate communities and have few friends or associates in the other tribe.1616 Social media bubbles have further fortified the division as neither side is exposed to the other’s perspective on common problems.1717

The only thing that both tribes appear to agree on is that neither feels represented by or trusts the government, which both increasingly view as corrupt, disinterested and unaccountable.1818 But the fall in trust is far broader than just dissatisfaction with elected representation. Trust in a wide array of institutions, including the judiciary, the police, the press, schools, religious institutions, business, and the medical system, is at historic lows in both tribes.1919 Indeed, the only public institution that more than 50% of citizens trust is the military and even popular trust in it has fallen to a multi-decade low.

The simultaneous decline in trust in government, institutions and co-patriots of other tribes is worrying social and political scientists regarding Bananastan’s future stability.2020 Social capital, or the “glue” of society, is highly related to inter-personal and inter-group trust within it. As Bananastanislose trust in one another and social institutions, that glue weakens and self-resolution of conflict becomes more difficult.2121 Studies suggest that low levels of social capital are incompatible with democratic governance.2222 Plunging trust in government limits its ability to adjudicate conflict to halt the slide in social cohesion.2323 Without these mechanisms, the potential for political violence, civil strife and even civil war increases.2424

Recently, both Hooter and Townie leaders and independent analysts have begun to warn that tribal factionalism is on the verge of spilling into violence and perhaps civil war.2525 Secessionist movements in provinces dominated by one tribe or the other (or minorities within provinces) have increased.2626 Even a sovereign constitutional crisis has arisen between the Dodder-led federal government and a Hooter-led province over the rights of each to control immigration.2727 Against this backdrop, three fifths of Bananastanis expect an increase in political violence, nearly half fear a civil war, and, shockingly, a third now believe violent insurrection is justifiable.2828

Although largely confined to the fringes, both Hooter and Townie extremists appear to be actively preparing for armed conflict. The Dodder justice ministry, and Townie-leaning media and academy have focused largely on Hooter extremism, due to a long history of armed Hooter militias, terrorist attacks, the attack on parliament, and greater number of incidents.2929 Worries also have grown about Hooter sympathies within the military, the sole trusted public institution: a disproportionate share of the Hooters in the parliament riot were veterans and a former general warned that a military coup was conceivable in 2024.3030 Soon after taking office, President Dodder’s minister for war launched a widespread purge of suspected Hooter extremists from the military.3131 As with other prosecutions, however, Hooters perceive an anti-Hooter bias and point to rising incidents of Townie extremist attacks, albeit from a lower level.3232

A top counterinsurgency expert has warned that Bananastan increasingly mirrors the typical pattern of violent insurgencies, and no one should take comfort from either violence being confined to the fringes or lower levels of Townie violence so far.3333 He notes that in all insurgencies, violence is confined to the top 1-3% of a movement’s social “pyramid” and, while Townies lag Hooters’ armed “tip” and Hooters lag Townie’s organizing and propaganda “base,” both are moving at speed to complete their respective insurgency pyramids. Increasing numbers of Townie extremists are arming rapidly and overtly – with the seeming approval of Townie media3434 – while Hooters are just as swiftly building communications and propaganda networks.3535

Tribal elites on both sides, whether intentionally or irresponsibly, regularly toss matches into this tinderbox, consistent with historical evidence that elite jockeying for power often is the catalyst for civil wars.3636 Both Townie and Hooter elites increasingly use dehumanizing language to describe the rival tribe, casually calling the others “deplorables”, “vermin”, “treasonous rats”, or “not even human,” and both presidential candidates have compared the other to history’s most notorious mass-murdering dictators.3737

Fanned by provocative statements by Mr. Loudt, some of which he has recently backtracked from,3838 elite Townie voices have grown increasingly shrill heading into the election, with increasing calls for “any means necessary” to prevent what they see as a coming Hooter dictatorship.3939 A popular Townie podcaster publicly stated that even if President Dodder’s son had “the corpses of children in his basement” censoring such news was justifiable to prevent a re-election of President Loudt.4040 Studies and surveys indicate that the caustic rhetoric from elites on both sides is having effect, both in driving intertribal tensions and in creating demand for a “tough leader who will crack down on those who undermine Bananastani values,” a view now held by sizeable majorities in both tribes, but especially Hooters.4141 Perhaps more pertinently, it is normalizing threats (and acts) of political violence. Multiple Townie celebrities have “joked” about assassinating former President Loudt, a play dramatized it, a painter fictionalized it, and the editor of a leading national newspaper was accused by a Hooter member of parliament of calling for it.4242 Threats and attempted assassinations have increased, including multiple attempts on both Messrs. Dodder and Loudt.4343

Power struggles among Hooter and Townie elites are not the only source of sparks with the potential to ignite political instability or violence in Bananastan. There is evidence that at least two of Bananastan’s geopolitical rivals are actively stoking tribal tensions through social media manipulation and aid to both tribal extremist groups and provincial secessionist movements.4444 Somewhat alarmingly, in the last year, Bananastan apprehended more illegal entrants from its cross-oceanic geopolitical rival, Sinoland, crossing its Southern land border than it had in the prior ten years combined, most of them military-aged men.4545

Surprisingly, Bananastan’s capital markets are unfazed by what appears to be a political powder keg rolling towards a white-hot election. Rising levels of political violence and public acceptance of it in a society with high and widespread animosity between the two main tribes, low levels of trust and satisfaction in government and most public and private institutions – except the military – seems to have no effect. A roaring economy has pushed Bananastan’s large, liquid stock market to new highs and is keeping the Bananastan denarius near historic highs. Perhaps more surprising, despite an historically high debt-to-GDP ratio, interest payments surging with higher global real interest rates, and a third of marketable government debt due to roll this year – with the Dodder treasury planning to increase the short-term share in its refinancings4646 – government bond prices show little sign of distress. Term premia, though off historic lows, are still relatively low and most consider Bananastan’s debt to be “risk free.”

Confronting reality

Politics of the United States now engenders such strong views, even among non-Americans, that it can be difficult to see the forest from the trees. Even those that have noticed the diseased, desiccated trees of modern American political dysfunction might miss that the entire wood lacks only a spark for disastrous conflagration. That a century and a half of stability have made America the anchor of the global polity, economy and markets makes the idea of serious political instability or civil war unimaginable. Like the perspective one gains looking at the forest from a distance, re-examining US circumstances as those of a fictitious place with a different cast of characters can reveal things our emotions or historical biases won’t allow us to see.

Contrary to the received wisdom of the chattering classes, a second presidential term for Donald Trump is not the worst outcome possible in the 2024 US election.4747 As would be apparent to any analyst tasked with evaluating “Bananastan’s” political economy or markets, a far more disastrous outcome appears wholly feasible; i.e. that the election, or events surrounding it, precipitate a descent into serious US political instability, violence, civil war, and possible dissolution of the union. (If you believe that I’m misstating the graveness of the US situation, I encourage you to read through all of the linked articles in the 7 pages of end notes to this piece.) Such an outcome would obviously be a tragedy for the US and its peoples, and likely for the world. But it would be absolute carnage for global markets.

The US is not only the anchor of the global political order, economy and markets, and its navy the guarantor of free navigation of the seas on which global trade depends — current Red Sea problems are just the tip of the iceberg — but the yield on its debt is also the “risk-free” rate anchoring every global asset. Political instability in the US would simultaneously crush global risk appetite while robbing the world of its safe asset.

Compared to that, what does it matter for markets if President Biden or President Trump occupies the White House next year? As I wrote in Leitmotif 5, for an election result to affect markets, it must both be a surprise and shift policies in some market-meaningful fashion. Current polling suggests that either man may be elected, so it won’t be a surprise. And while I do not want to minimize the large differences between the two candidates, what market-critical policies are really going to change? “De-risking” from or tariffs on China? US deficit spending? Subsidies for onshoring? More fracking? Mr. Trump was far more willing to openly criticize the Fed, but there is little evidence that it affected their policy choices. Furthermore, markets have been convinced throughout the Biden administration that the Fed lacked the political will to raise rates or, now, to hold them higher for longer.

But of course, maybe the chattering classes are correct: Donald Trump harbors dictatorial ambitions. But dreaming and doing are two very differentthings. To effect a dictatorship Mr. Trump would require supermajorities in both houses of Congress, something that no Republican president since the 1870s has enjoyed, and which both polling and the number of “blue” states suggest has near-zero likelihood. Even then, he would need to overcome both the Federal bureaucracy and judiciary, neither of which showed any willingness to cooperate with him in his first term. Furthermore, he demonstratedin his first term that he lacks the governing competence and the political machine necessary to fill the 3,000 Executive Service appointments required to manage a vast bureaucracy.

So, for a Trump dictatorship to emerge, we’d need to assume that (1) in the last four years he’s learned how to manage 2¼ million civilian government employees, whose surveyed party affiliation leans heavily towards Democrats, and 2¼ million military personnel, whose officer corps his predecessor just purged of his sympathizers; (2) the Republican Party he has taken over, but in which he is winning only just over 50% of the primary vote, will provide him with a loyalist political machine to staff all his appointments; (3) that Republicans – and not just any Republicans, all loyalists of Mr. Trump – will sweep both houses of Congress with supermajorities in each; (4) that all of the Democratic appointees in the Federal judiciary will resign en masse, clearing a path for a (ready) slate of Trump loyalist appointees; and (5) that all US states, including all the blue ones, cooperate with the new Trump administration. I would argue that none of these are likely individually, and that their joint probability is – in precise mathematical terms – asymptotically close to zero.

US political instability in or around this year’s election is not my base case and I do not think one can put a probability on it. But a realistic read of the current US situation suggests that its probability is not small. More concretely, it is far more likely – and its market effects far more consequential – than a Trump dictatorship.

How then does one hedge US political instability? Those are insights I reserve for paying subscribers. Wouldn’t you like to be one?

[1] “Donald Trump’s long history of racism, from the 1970s to 2020,” German Lopez, Vox, 13 August 2020; “The 15 most offensive things that have come out of Trump’s mouth,” Nick Gass, Politico, 8 December 2015; “The Complete List of Trump’s Twitter Insults (2015-2021),” Kevin Quealy, The New York Times, 19 January 2021; and “Donald Trump sexism tracker: Every offensive comment in one place,” Claire Cohen, The Telegraph, 7 November 2020. [2] “The ‘Shared Psychosis’ of Donald Trump and His Loyalists,” Tanya Lewis, Scientific American, 11 January 2021; “Chomsky Says Trump a ‘Sociopathic Megalomaniac’ Who Made US ‘Singularly Unprepared’ for Pandemic,” Andrea Germanos, Common Dreams, 25 May 2020; “Donald Trump Megalomania,” Mark F. Kalita, independently published, 2019; “Finally tally of lies: Analysts say Trump told 30,000 mistruths – that’s 21 a day – during presidency,” Gino Spocchia, The Independent, 21 January 2021; and “Trump’s Habit of Lying About Everything All the Time May Cost Him Trump Tower,” Bess Levin, Vanity Fair, 27 September 2023; and “The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump,” Brandy X. Lee, Ed., Thomas Dunne Books, 2017. [3] “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election,” Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019; and “Report On Matters Related To Intelligence Activities And Investigations Arising Out Of The 2016 Presidential Campaigns,” Special Counsel John H. Durham, U.S. Department of Justice, 12 May 2023. [4] “Biden attacks Trump as threat to democracy, warns against his re-election,” Al Jazeera, 6 January 2024; “Biden on Trump ‘dictator’ remark: ‘He’s saying it out loud,’” Steve Holland, Reuters, 11 December 2023; “A New Kind of Fascism,” Christopher R. Browning, The Atlantic, 25 July 2023; “Trump’s Fascist Rhetoric Only Emphasizes the Stakes in 2024,” John Cassidy, The New Yorker, 14 November 2023; “Another Trump Presidency Is the Biggest Threat to Liberal Democracy,” Chris Patten, Project Syndicate, 2 January 2024; “There Is No ‘Both Sides’ to Donald Trump’s Threat to Democracy,” Molly Jong-Fast, Vanity Fair, 8 January 2024; “’Openly authoritarian campaign’: Trump’s threats of revenge fuel alarm,” Peter Stone, The Guardian, 22 November 2023; and YouGov poll, 14-16 March, 2016. [5] “CNN Poll: Percentage of Republicans who think Biden’s 2020 win was illegitimate ticks back up 70%,” Jennifer Agiesta & Ariel Edwards-Levy, CNN, 3 August 2023; “Almost a third of Americans still believe the 2020 election result was fraudulent,” Ben Kamisar, NBC News, 20 June 2023; “Capitol Police Officer Dies From Injuries in Pro-Trump Rampage,” Michael S. Schmidt, The New York Times, 8 January 2021. [6] “Capitol riots timeline: What happened on 6 January 2021?BBC, 2 August 2023; and “Capitol attack: the five people who died,” Kenya Evelyn, The Guardian, 8 January 2021. [7] “The Secret History of the Shadow Campaign That Saved the 2020 Election,” Molly Ball, Time, 4 February 2021. [8] “The Twitter Files, Part 1,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 2 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 2: Twitter’s Secret Blacklists,” Bari Weiss (@bariweiss), X, 9 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 3: The Removal of Donald Trump,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 9 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 4: The Removal of Donald Trump: January 7,” Michael Shellenberger (@shellenberger), X, 10 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 5: The Removal of Trump from Twitter,” Bari Weiss (@bariweiss), X, 12 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 6: Twitter, The FBI Subsidiary,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 16 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 7: The FBI & the Hunter Biden Laptop,” Michael Shellenberger (@shellenberger), X, 19 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 8: How Twitter Quietly Aided the Pentagon’s Covert Online PsyOp Campaign,” Lee Fang (@lhfang), X, 20 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 9: Twitter and ‘Other Government Agencies’,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 24 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 10: How Twitter Rigged the Covid Debate,” David Zweig (@davidzweig), X, 26 December 2022; “The Twitter Files, Part 11: How Twitter Let the Intelligence Community In,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 3 January 2023; “The Twitter Files, Part 12: Twitter and the FBI ‘Belly Button,’” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 3 January 2023; “The Twitter Files, Part 13” Alex Berenson (@AlexBerenson), X, 9 January 2023; “The Twitter Files, Part 14: The Russiagate lies,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 12 January 2023; “The Twitter Files, Part 15: Move over Jayson Blair: Twitter Files Expose Next Great Media Fraud,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 27 January 2023; “The Twitter Files, Part 16: Comic Interlude: A Media Experiment,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 19 February 2023; “The Twitter Files, Part 17: New Knowledge, the Global Engagement Center, and State-Sponsored Blacklists,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 2 March 2023; “The Twitter Files, Part 18: Statement to Congress, The Censorship-Industrial Complex,” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 9 March 2023; “The Twitter Files, Part 19: The Great Covid-19 Lie Machine, Stanford, the Virality Project, and the Censorship of ‘True Stories,’” Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X, 17 March 2023; “The Twitter Files, Part 20: The Information Cartel,” Andrew Lowenthal (@NAffects), X, 25 April 2023; and “The Twitter Files, Part 21: How to Find Russians Anywhere,” Matt Orfalea (@Ørf), X, 25 April 2023. [9] “The January 6 investigation is the biggest in U.S. history. It’s only half done,” Spencer S. Hsu, Devlin Barrett & Tom Jackman, The Washington Post, 18 March 2023; “1,000 people have been charged for the Capital riot. Here’s where their cases stand,” Meg Anderson & Nick McMillan, NPR, 25 March 2023; “In a D.C. jail, Jan. 6 defendants awaiting trial are forming bitter factions,” Tom Dreisbach, NPR, 14 April 2022; “Lawmakers give conflicting accounts of how Jan. 6 defendants being treated in D.C. jail after touring facility,” Scott MacFarlane, CBS News, 25 March 2023; “Jan. 6 defendants win unlikely Dem champions as they face harsh detainment,” Kyle Cheney, Andrew Desiderio & Josh Gerstein, Politico, 19 April 2021; “Feds admit breaking law with delay in case against alleged Jan. 6 rioter,” Josh Gerstein, Politico, 14 March 2022; and “A Jan. 6 rioter was convicted and sentenced in secret. No one will say way,” Alanna Durkin Richer & Michael Kunzelman, Associated Press, 15 September 2023. [10] “Trump’s 91 criminal charges and where they stand,” Brie Sparkman & Sara Wiatrak, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, 11 January 2024; “Rudy Giuliani pleads not guilty to Georgia election racketeering charges,” Associated Press, 2 September 2023; and “Trump and 18 others charged in Georgia election inquiry,” Kayla Epstein & Madeline Halpert, BBC, 15 August 2023. [11] “Colorado Supreme Court declares Donald Trump is ineligible for the White House,” Nicholas Riccardi, Associated Press, 20 December 2023; “Colorado’s disqualification of Trump from the 2024 ballot puts the US in uncharted constitutional territory,” Andrea Scoseria, LSE Blog, 22 December 2023; and “Election officials must block Trump. The Constitution demands it.” Quentin Young, Louisiana Illuminator, 14 April 2023. [12] “Donald Trump blasts ‘evil and heinous abuse of power’ after second indictment,” Stefania Palma, James Politi & Joshua Chaffin, 14 June 2023; and “’Outrageous’: Republicans vent their fury following Manhattan grand jury’s indictment of Trump in Stormy Daniels ‘hush’ money probe – and vow to exploit ‘blatant abuse of power’ to put him BACK in the White House,” Geoff Earle, The Daily Mail, 30 March 2023. [13] “Republicans threaten to boycott Jan. 6 committee after Pelosi bars two Trump allies,” France 24, 22 July 2021; “All Americans – including those arrested in the Jan. 6 riots – deserved due process,” Senator Rand Paul, Opinion, Fox News, 10 February 2022; “The January 6 Insurrection Hoax,” Roger Kimball, The New Criterion, 20 September 2021; “How lagging prosecutions and long jail stays are fanning the flames of Jan. 6 extremism,” Laura Italiano, Business Insider, 30 March 2022; and “The Cult of the January 6 Martyrs,” Laura Jedeed, The New Republic, 6 March 2023. [14] “Biden impeachment inquiry explained: what is happening and could the president be convicted?” Jonathan Yerushalmy, The Guaradian, 14 December 2023. [15] “As Partisan Hostility Grows, Signs of Frustration With the Two-Party System,” Pew Research Center, 9 August 2022; and “Misperceptions about out-partisans’ democratic values may erode democracy,” Michael H. Pasek, Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky, Alex Levy-Vene, & Samatha L. Moore-Berg, Scientific Reports, vol. 12, art. 16284, 29 September 2023. [16] “The measurement of partisan sorting for 180 million voters,” Jacob R. Brown & Ryan D. Enos, Nature Human Behaviour (5), 8 March 2021; “Are Americans Purposely Moving Next to People Who Share Their Politics?” Dora Mekouar, Voice of America, 18 May 2022; and “Partisan animosity, personal politics, views of Trump,” Pew Research Center, 5 October 2017. [17] “Social Media, Echo Chambers, and Political Polarization,” Pablo Barberá, in Social Media and Democracy, Ed. Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker, Cambridge University Press, 2020; “How tech platforms fuel U.S. political polarization and what government can do about it,” Paul Barrett, Justin Hendrix & Grant Sims, Brookings Institution, 27 September 2021; and “Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization,” Christopher A. Bail, Lisa P. Argyle, Taylor W. Brown, & Alexander Volfowsky, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), vol. 115, no. 37, 28 August 2018. [18] “Americans’ Dismal Views of the Nation’s Politics,” Pew Research Center, 19 September 2023. [19] “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2023,” Pew Research Center, 19 September 2023; and “Confidence in Institutions,” Gallup. [20] “Social Cohesion Is Vital, and We’re Losing It,” Richard Heinberg, resilience, 13 January 2022; “Polarization, Democracy, and Political Violence in the United States: What the Research Says,” Rachel Kleinfeld, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 September 2023; “How to Tell When Your Country Is Past the Point of No Return,” Thomas B. Edsall, The New York Times, 15 December 2021; and “Who Is Us?: A Project on American Identity,” The Aspen Institute. [21] “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Robert D. Putnam, Journal of Democracy, vol. 6, no. 1, January 1995; “Social Capital: Why We Need It and How We Can Create More of It,” Isabel V. Sawhill, Brookings Institution, July 2020; “America is losing its social capital,” Tomas Hinckley, The Daily Campus, 5 October 2023; and “Erosian of Social Capital a Major Problem, Say Experts,” Leo Doran, Inside Sources, 17 May 2017. [22] “What Happens When Democracies Become Perniciously Polarized,” Jennifer McCoy & Benjamin Press, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 January 2022. [23] “From Political Violence to Political Trust? How Transitional Justice Affects Citzen Views of Government,” Risa Kitagawa, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 67, no. 1, March 2023; “How can political trust be built after civil wars? Evidence from post-conflict Sierra Leone,” Pui-Hang Wong et alia, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 53, no. 6, 13 October 2016; and “Building trust among enemies: The central challenge for international conflict resolution,” Herbert C. Kelman, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, vol. 29, no. 6, November 2005. [24] How Civil Wars Start, Barbara F. Walters, Penguin Random House, 2023; and Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, Population Change and State Breakdown in England, France, Turkey, and China, 1600-1850, Jack A. Gladstone, Routledge, 25th Anniversary Edition, 2016. [25] “Jimmy Carter: I fear for our Democracy,” President Jimmy Carter, opinion, The New York Times, 5 January 2022; Ages of Discord, Peter Turchin, Beresta Books, 2016; and The Next Civil War: Dispatches from the American Future, Stephen Marche, Avid Reader Press/Simon & Schuster, 2023. [26] “Secession is here: States, cities and the wealthy are already withdrawing from America,” Michael J. Lee, The Conversation, 20 March 2023; “Analysis: Secession movements underscore a polarized America,” Reid Wilson, pluribus news, 26 February 2023; “Secession movements gain traction in US amid deepening political rifts: ‘A long-standing problem,’” Jon Brown, Fox News, 2 December 2022; “America: Love It Or Leave It,” Kaia Hubbard, U.S. News & World Report, 5 November 2021; and List of active separatist movements in North America, Wikipedia. [27] “What’s Really Happening in Biden vs. Abbott vs. the Supreme Court,” Stephen I. Vladeck, The New York Times(opinion), 1 February 2024; “The crisis within Texas’ border crisis,” Ankush Khardori, Politico, 30 January 2024; “Texas ‘defending itself from border invasion’ in migrant crisis row,” Rozina Sabur, The Telegraph, 27 January 2024; and “Illegal Migration Forcing U.S. Constitutional Crisis,” Rod Dreher, The European Conservative, 26 January 2024. [28] “Two in five Americans say a civil war is at least somewhat likely in the next decade,” Taylor Orth, YouGov, 26 August 2022; and “1 in 3 Americans say violence against the government can be justified, citing fears of a political schism, pandemic,” Meryl Kornfield & Mariana Alfaro, The Washington Post, 1 January 2022. [29] “The Rise of Political Violence in the United States,” Rachel Kleinfeld, Journal of Democracy, vol. 32, no. 4, October 2021; “The Escalating Terrorism Problem in the United States,” Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee & Nicholas Harrington, Center for Strategic International Studies, 17 June 2020; “Surveying the Landscape of the American Far Right,” Mark Pitcavage, George Washington University Project on Extremism, August 2019; The Militia Movement, Anti-Defamation League, 2020; “Investigators Eye Right-Wing Militias at Capitol Riot,” Adam Goldman, Katie Benner & Alan Feuer, The New York Times, as updated 10 June 2021; Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism, Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 2021; and “Domestic Terrorism: Focus on Militia Extremism,” FBI News, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 22 September 2011. [30] “Nearly 1 In 5 Defendants In Capitol Riot Cases Served In the Military,” Tom Dreisbach & Meg Anderson, NPR, 21 January 2021; and “Prepare for Military Coup After 2024 Election, Ex-General Warns,” Brendan Cole, Newsweek, 31 December 2021. [31] “Biden’s Secretary of Defense Is Moving to Purge the Military of White Supremacists,” Eric Lutz, Vanity Fair, 4 February 2021; and “’Close the loopholes’: The Pentagon’s next front in its hunt for extremists,” Bryan Benker, Politico, 4 April 2022. [32] “Tom Cotton: Send In the Troops,” Senator Tom Cotton, opinion, The New York Times, as updated with editor’s note 5 June 2020; “Steube: Democrats Refuse to Acknowledge Widespread Antifa Violence as Domestic Terrorism Despite Overwhelming Evidence,” Congressman Greg Steube, press release, 25 February 2021; “Andy Ngo, Antifa and the Breakdown of American Justice,” Melissa Chen, Konstantin Kisin Substack, 16 August 2023; “Media’s Defense of Antifa: Former Member Exposes Ignored Violence,” Eightify (undated summary and link to Fox News television interview; “Far-left versus Far-right Fatal Violence: An Empirical Assessment of the Prevalence of Ideologically Motivated Homicides in the United States,” Celinet Duran, Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society, vol. 22, no. 2, 2021. [33] “Home of the hateful, fearful, heavily armed,” David Kilcullen, The Australian, 30 May 2020. [34] “Far-Left Extremist Groups in the United States,” Counter Extremism Project, August 2022; “Anti-Fascist. Armed to the Teeth,” Jack Crosbie, Rolling Stone, 18 May 2023; “’If others have rifles, we’ll have rifles’: why US leftist groups are taking up arms,” Kim Kelly, The Guardian, 22 July 2019; “A New Wave of Left-Wing Militants Is Ready to Rumble in Portland – and Beyond,” Madison Pauly, Mother Jones, May/June 2017; and “Redneck Revolt: the armed leftwing group that wants to stamp out fascism,” Cecilia Saixue Watt, The Guardian, 11 July 2017. [35] “Right wing builds its own echo chamber,” Sara Fischer & Dan Primack, Axios, 12 December 2021; “Digital Populism: The Internet and the Rise of Right-wing Populism,” Sena Eksi, European Center for Populism Studies, 26 December 2021“Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other right-wing sites,” Aisha Majid, Press Gazette, 27 January 2021; Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics, Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris & Hal Roberts, Oxford Academic Press, 18 October 2018; “The Koch Network and Republican Party Extremism,” Theda Skocpol & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 14, no. 3, 31 August 2016; and “The Online Extremist Ecosystem,” Heather J. Williams, et alia, Perspective, Rand Corporation, December 2021. [36] “Intra-Elite Competition: A Key Concept for Understanding the Dynamics of Complex Societies,” Peter Turchin, blog, peterturchin.com, 30 December 2016. [37] “Read Hillary Clinton’s ‘Basket of Deplorables’ Remarks About Donald Trump Supporters,” Katie Reilly, Time, 10 September 2016; “Trump is not the only one who calls opponents ‘animals.’ Democrats and Republicans do it to each other,” Alexander Theodoridis & James Martherus, The Washington Post, 21 May 2018; “Party Animals? Extreme Partisan Polarization and Dehumanization,” James Martherus, Andy Martinez, Paul K. Piff, & Alexander G. Theodoridis, Political Behaviour, vol. 43, no. 2, June 2021; “After Calling Foes ‘Vermin’ Trump Campaign Warns Its Critics Will Be ‘Crushed,’” Michael Gold, The New York Times, 13 November 2023; and “Why Biden’s campaign keeps linking Trump to Hitler,” Holly Otterbein, Elena Schneider & Jonathan Lemire, Politico, 19 December 2023. [38] “Trump backs off 2024 campaign theme threatening political ‘retribution,’” Alexandra Hutzler, ABC News, 11 January 2024; “Trump Promised Retribution. He’s Not So Sure That’s What Iowa Voters Want.” Eric Cortellessa, Time, 15 January 2024; “’Other than day one’: Trump supercharges concerns of dictatorship in second term,” Brett Samuels & Alex Ganitano, The Hill, 12 July 2023; and “Pledging ‘retribution,’ Trump fuels fears for rule of law,” Piotr Smolar, Le Monde, 8 December 2023. [39] “This is how democracies die,” Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, The Guardian, 21 January 2018; “It’s Time for Democrats to Break the Glass,” Ronald Brownstein, The Atlantic, 6 January 2022; “Democratic 2020 strategy must be gloves off, abandon all subtlety: ‘Trump will kill your dog!’” Lucian K. Truscott, IV, Salon, 27 July 2019; “Democrats say they’re saving democracy. So why are they bending it?” David Winston, Roll Call, 7 September 2022; and Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary, website. [40] “Sam Harris: Trump, Religion, Wokeness,” Triggernometry, YouTube (video link), August 2022. [41] “Both Democrats and Republicans think the opposite party has stronger negative feelings about them than they actually do,” Christian Rigg, Political Psychology, 6 April 2021; “Exaggerated meta-perceptions predict intergroup hostility between American political partisans,” Samantha L. Moore-Berg, Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky, Boaz Hameiri, & Emilie Bruneau, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), vol. 117, no. 26, 11 June 2020; “Metadehumanization erodes democratic norms during 2020 presidential election,” Alexander P. Landry, Elliott Ihm, Spencer Kwit, & Jonathan W. Schooler, @sap Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, vol. 21, no. 1, December 2021; and “Survey: A large number of Americans want an anti-democratic leader,” Tarah Williams, Andrew Bloeser & Brian Harward, PBS, 9 February 2023. [42] “Actor Johnny Depp apologizes for ‘poor taste’ Trump assassination joke,” Paul Sandle, Reuters, 23 June 2017; “Carole Cook Jokes About President Trump Assassination: ‘Why Not?’” Alexia Fernández, People, 10 September 2018; “Another Hollywood star ‘joked’ about killing Trump, but no one’s laughing,” Juana Summers, CNN, 24 June 2017; “The Assassination of Donald Trump Painting,” Jay Rechsteiner, painting, acrylic on canvas, Saatchi Art; and “Matt Gaetz accuses media of ‘greenlighting’ Trump assassination,” Gustaf Kilander, The Independent, 5 December 2023. [43] “Billings man charged with making threats to kill U.S. Sen. Jon Tester, threats against President Joe Biden,” press release, U.S. Department of Justice, 27 September 2023; “FBI shoots and kills man suspected of threatening Joe Biden,” Sky News, 10 August 2023; “Death Threats to Members of Congress Have Doubled This Year, Capitol Police Say,” Rebecca Klapper, Newsweek, 18 May 2021; “Over 12,000 tweets are calling for Trump’s assassination. Here’s how the Secret Service handles it,” Sasha Lekach, Mashable, 2 February 2017; “Canadian woman who attempted to assassinate Trump sentenced to 22 years behind bars,” Lawrence Richard, Fox News, 18 August 2023; “’He never even watched the news’ – the Brit who tried to kill Trump,” Nell Frizzell, The Guardian, 27 January 2017; and Security incidents involving Donald Trump, Wikipedia. [44] “Meta closes nearly 4,800 fake accounts in China that tried to polarize US voters,” The Guardian, 30 November 2023; “Suspected Chinese operatives using AI generated images to spread disinformation among US voters, Microsoft says,” Sean Lyngaas, CNN, 7 September 2023; “China-Linked Internet Trolls Try Fueling Divisions in U.S. Midterms, Researchers Say,” Dustin Volz, The Wall Street Journal, 26 October 2022; “Chinese influence operation seeks to sow political discord, ‘aggressively’ targets U.S. midterms,” AJ Vicens, Cyberscoop, 26 October 2022; “Foreign Interference in U.S. Elections Focuses on Cultivating Distrust to Reduce Political Consensus,” Marek N. Posard, RAND Corporation, 1 October 2020; “US charges 4 Americans, 3 Russians in election discord case,” Curt Anderson, Associated Press, 18 April 2023; “A leading California secession advocate got funding and direction from Russian intelligence agents, US government alleges,” Charles R. Davis, Business Insider, 2 August 2022; and “Texas, California Separatists Attend Kremlin-Funded Conference,” ABC News, 27 September 2016. [45] “Growing Numbers of Chinese Migrants Are Crossing the Southern Border,” Eileen Sullivan, The New York Times, 24 November 2023; and “Migrants find tips on Chinese version of TikTok for long trek to U.S.-Mexico border,” Echo Wang & Mica Rosenberg, Reuters, 28 April 2023. [46] Marketable US Treasury debt maturing in the next year represents 33.8% of total marketable debt; 68% of net new borrowing in 2024 is projected to be T-Bills, bringing the total short-term debt share to 34.5% by year end; Quarterly Release Data: 2024 – 1st Quarter, U.S. Treasury Department, 12 January 2024. [47] “Another Trump Presidency Is the Biggest Threat to Liberal Democracy,” Chris Patten, Project Syndicate, 2 January 2024; “Opinion: The big risks facing the world in 2024,” Frida Ghitis, CNN, 27 December 2023; “The world cannot hedge against Donald Trump,” Edward Luce, Financial Times, 6 December 2023; and “Donald Trump poses the biggest danger to the world in 2024,” The Economist, 16 November 2023.

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Economic and market forecasts:

Economic & market forecasts
  • Sustained higher US rates, vulnerability of backend rates and term premia to steepening in H2 2023: Are we there yet?

  • No recession, continued strength of US economy throughout 2023: Solved: Drivers of the dollar cycle; Clash of the Themes; Are we there yet?; Opportunity knocks: Are you listening?; Götterdämmerung.

  • No backtracking or “pivot” by the Fed in 2023: Solved: Drivers of the dollar cycle; Clash of the Themes; Are we there yet?; Opportunity knocks: Are you listening?; Götterdämmerung.

  • No banking crisis or reversal by the Fed following the failures of Silicon Valley Bank: Did QE cause bank failures? Opportunity knocks: Are you listening?

  • No new “Plaza Accord” resulting from US dollar strength and Fed rate hikes in 2022: Plaza 2.0 bid, not offered.

  • No default by Nigeria before or in the aftermath of the 2023 national elections: Debt reality versus perceptions.

  • The continued fall in US real rates through the 2000s and early 2010s. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the associated $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere undermined the marginal product of capital in the US while simultaneously increasing non-US demand for US Treasuries.

  • Emerging market outperformance in the 2000s. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) drove both the development of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere and the commodity supercycle, while Apex neoliberalism supported institutional reforms that lowered EM risk premia, all of which encouraged foreign direct investment that raised productivity and led to rapid economic growth.

  • The end of emerging markets’ “original sin” and growth of EM local bond markets, a development supported by a G7 initiative that I led at the US Treasury. Themes & framework: The $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere provided a new stability in many EM exchange rates while institutional reforms undertaken by many as part of Apex neoliberalism lowered EM risk premia.

  • The Global Financial Crisis (albeit see admission of errors below). Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere simultaneously increased incentives for debt finance in the US (as demand for “safe” USD bonds rose globally) while undermining US means of repayment as the US marginal product of capital in traded goods fell. Combined with poorly designed bank regulation that allowed banks to leverage themselves well beyond regulators’ intent (Apex neoliberalism), “complexity cascaded”.

  • The failure of QE to generate post-GFC inflation. Themes & framework: Believing is being: inflation expectations were stable to falling amid deleveraging and associated lethargic income growth, lowering real interest rates as nominal rates were pinned at the zero lower bound, and implying sustained weak money demand. Stuffing banks with more reserves changed none of those variables. As Keynes described seven decades earlier – in the absence of negative nominal rates – monetary policy at the zero lower bound is equivalent to “pushing on a string”.

  • The lack of effect of balance sheet runoff on interest rates. Themes & framework: Believing is being and portfolio theory rejected the then dominant “portfolio balance” theory of QE. QE was a credible commitment by central banks to keep rates on hold, suppressing expectations for future rates and thus the yield curve. This is why the “Taper Tantrum” had its largest effects on 3-5 year forward rates as expectations for rates hiked rose, while long-dated forward rates fell. Measures of long-dated term premia continued to fall as the Fed reduced its balance sheet.

  • Peak Chinese growth in 2011. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) led to unsustainable contributions of investment to GDP and a collapse in China’s marginal product of capital amid historically large debt to GDP, a phenomenon that peaked with China’s 50% surge in domestic credit in response to the GFC. Domestic funding of its debt trapped China within its own financial repression scheme, frustrating its efforts to unwind its $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere and internationalization the renminbi as a closed capital account is required to avoid savings flight and a collapse of the debt bubble. This self-funded debt bubble implies that losses from consequent overinvestment are “amortized” in the form of slower growth.

  • Emerging Market underperformance of the last decade (and likely future decade). Themes & framework: Institutional reform in EM peaked with US policy credibility before the GFC under Apex neoliberalism; China’s peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) in 2011 and the associated end of the commodity supercycle ended the “pack” economic benefits of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere, while simultaneously the advent of Localization began to shift production back to advanced economies. Amid stagnating growth and backsliding reforms, EM FX and asset prices looked (and continue to look) overvalued and risk spreads remain too thin.

  • Falling USD reserve share in the 2000s and a rising share since peak China. Themes & framework: The massive reserve accumulation required to sustain undervalution of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere came to be seen as “sovereign wealth” that required diversification, rather than a liquidity store for crises, and led to a consequent fall in the USD share of reserves. Yet the greater financial openness and cross-border claims that accompanied the Apex neoliberalism necessarily implied a proportional increase in capital outflows in periods of risk aversion; i.e. historically large reserves were not as large as perceived in reality. As China and the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere slowed after 2011, and Global entropy increased Uncertainty with attendant effects on risk aversion, emerging markets learned painfully in 2014 that reserves were neither excess nor sovereign wealth, but instead necessary liquidity, and that the USD’s safe haven properties were unparalleled.

  • Low and falling inflation throughout the 2010s. Themes & framework: Missingflation, the unexplained trend component of global inflation that had led to two decades of inflation overforecasting by economists, showed no signs of abating and seemed to be caused by a continued slide in inflation expectations (Believing is being) as central banks struggled with the zero lower bound. The end of the trend would require both for central banks to make more credible commitment to raise inflation in conjunction with a sustained positive inflation shock.

  • The (trend) bottoming of long-term US real rates, higher-than-expected peak in Fed funds rates and US equity outperformance in the last decade. Themes & framework: China’s peak in 2011 under Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the dissolution of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere ended the trend of falling US real rates they had created. But it wasn’t until Localization gathered sufficient steam – and the US private sector had deleveraged – that US openness and technological leadership sufficiently raised US returns to capital to support a rise in US real rates. The Trump administration’s political support (Politics of Rage) for Localization gave another nudge to US relative returns to capital, and Covid again accelerated these phenomena further (and likely more sustainably).

  • The capitulation of Saudi Arabia’s price leadership/management in 2014 in the face of surging US tight oil production leading to lower and more volatile crude oil prices. Themes & framework: The end of the commodity supercycle brought about by peak China under Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) paused relentless crude oil demand growth, allowing innovation and a business-friendly US regime to undermined Saudi Arabia’s price leadership with tight oil production. Cartel dynamics combined with Saudi Arabia’s long-run price maximization led to a collapse in Saudi-enforced OPEC discipline, and lower, more volatile crude oil prices.

  • Financial volatility’s shift to a lower median level with more frequent, shorter explosions during the last decade. Themes & framework: Rising Uncertainty in politics (Politics of Rage), geopolitics (Global entropy), technology (Localization), and policy (Missingflation) amid Complexity cascades shifted the relative shares of total risk away from quantifiable sources towards unquantifiable sources; the counter-intuitive implication of rising uncertainty is lower median volatility as active risk taking retreats in information lulls, with violent explosions of price activity when new information is revealed.

  • Persistence of post-Covid supply constraints and sustainable inflation supported by rearview-mirror central bank policies leading to a flip in the direction of Missingflation. Themes & framework: Covid simultaneously accelerated both the economic and political motivations for Localization, caused a permanent shift in the structure of global demand, and disrupted existing global supply chains. Short-run aggregate supply could not adjust to the jump in investment and shift in demand quickly enough, creating prolonged shortages and the need for prices to curtail demand. The associated cost-push inflation was all the spark needed to ignite Believing is being changes in inflation expectation driven by central banks’ backward-looking policies based on a lack of understanding of Missingflation.

  • The Fed’s post-Covid rate cycle would be more like 1994 than the post-2000 gradualist cycles (a call I made in early 2021). Themes & framework: The intent of the Fed’s FAIT policy always was to boost long-run inflation expectations by falling “behind the curve” on inflation. Yet their lack of understanding of the causes of Missingflation and insufficient faith in their own ability to generate Believing is being kept them focused on “fighting the last war” too long, allowing inflation to run too hot, too quickly. But contrary to market conventional wisdom, inflation is deeply politically unpopular in an aging society and no central banker wants to be remembered as failing to control inflation. Accordingly, the Fed (eventually) will react forcefully to contain the Believing is being genie they underestimated.

  • Consistent underperformance of European economy, assets and the euro since the Global Financial Crisis. Themes & framework: Relative to trend growth, Europe was more highly indebted than the US, yet European policymakers too long considered the GFC an “American problem”. Combined with Europe’s greater institutional rigidities and a reluctance to write down bad assets, it would take proportionately longer to achieve necessary deleveraging. China’s 2011 peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the rise of Localization undermined all parts of Europe: the globalization-dependent South and China-dependent North, while inflexibility and low levels of technological innovation inhibit Europe’s ability to adjust to the new global economic order.

  • UK outperformance of consensus Brexit forecasts. Themes & framework: Consensus forecast for post-Brexit UK were based on three flawed assumptions (due to underappreciation of themes!). First, by ignoring emergent Localization, growth forecasts grounded in Apex neoliberalism wrongly assumed globalization would continue to be a major driver of economic growth. Second, the consensus failed to acknowledge the UK’s long-run structural competitiveness: world-leading universities providing a technological edge in Localization; and strong, enduring institutions offering safety and stability amid Global entropy and rising Uncertainty. Third, the consensus, ironically, ignored the largest driver of trade (by a wide margin) in their own models: “gravity”, or proximity to trading partners. Network effects are extraordinarily powerful in trade and difficult to overcome.

  • Importance and implications for markets of Scottish independence referendum in 2014. Themes & framework: As one of the earliest manifestations of the Politics of Rage and its demands for greater political representation, the Scottish referendum was an unanticipated shock to markets and one of the first signs of Global entropy and the Uncertainty to come.

Global entropy

Manifest and growing disorder

By ignoring the endogeneity of complex systems and Rodrick’s globalization trilemma – that democracy, national self-determination, and economic globalization cannot enduringly coexist – Apex neoliberalism sowed the seeds of its own demise, leading to today’s manifest and growing global disorder: the end of Post-World War II international rules, rising ethnonationalism, multipolarity, the Politics of Rage, and the unwinding of globalized supply chains. In short, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations trumped Fukuyama’s End of History. Apex neoliberalism facilitated rising trade-to-income ratios, cross-border capital flows, intergovernmental cooperation, and intra-economy income inequality; while simultaneously lowering financial spreads, inter-economy income inequality, and inter-state warfare. Global entropy likely will reverse many of these effects.

Missingflation

Economists don’t understand inflation

What are economists missing about inflation? In the two decades before Covid, market analysts, academic economists and central banks consistently overforecast inflation; in the last two years they have persistently underforecast it. Enduring one-way errors are not “white noise”; they demonstrate bias and strongly suggest that economists’ current understanding of inflation is flawed. Demographics, globalization and technology help to explain some of the forecast miss, but significant omitted variable bias remains, most likely due to failure to explicitly incorporate Believing is being.

Believing is being

Self-fulfilling beliefs are real

Beliefs drive everything from asset bubbles, to debt dynamics, to crypto currencies’ values, to inflation and hyperinflations (probably Missingflation, too). Good economists understand this but often omit beliefs from models to simplify because of the difficulty in measuring beliefs. Unfortunately, too many bad economists copy those models without understanding the potential for omitted variable bias. The rapid social, technological, political, and geopolitical changes behind Global entropy and Uncertainty are swiftly shifting beliefs, driving a feedback loop of economic and political outcomes. Yet the infrequency of these deviations and difficulty in measuring them make statistical modeling nearly impossible. Only through economic theory and full-spectrum information collection can we infer when and how beliefs are adjusting and their likely effects.

Complexity cascades

Complex systems fail unpredictably

Human societies, nation states and (especially) economies are examples of complex systems. Complex systems always operate in “broken” mode and ironically are more structurally stable when they have lots of small failures. But when they are subjected to massive or cascading shocks, complex systems can fail unpredictably and totally. Covid and manifest Global entropy represent self-reinforcing mammoth shockwaves that imply systemic collapses – in all spheres, socio-political, geopolitical, economic, and financial – are more likely than the consensus admits.

Uncertainty

Not all risks can be quantified

All risks are not the same. Some are quantifiable, like the chance of being dealt an ace in a game of cards. Others are not but can be subjectively guessed, like the chance you leave a casino a winner. Then there is uncertainty, the most dangerous of all risks because it is by definition, non-quantifiable: what is the chance the casino gets hit by a meteor? Apex neoliberalism created a façade of quantifiable risks; Global entropy and Complexity cascades are illustrating that the world is far more uncertain. The quantitative models in finance, business, economics, and politics that gained dominance during Apex neoliberalism generally have performed poorly as Global entropy has become more pronounced, a trend that is likely to sustain as uncertainty rises further. Scenario analysis and “satisficing” are the only proven frameworks for dealing with uncertainty.

Politics of Rage

The proletariat want their franchise back

Four decades ago, globalization and increasing economic returns to intellectual capital opened a fissure between elites and everyone else, especially in more developed economies. The economic and political consequences of Apex neoliberalism widened this fissure into a chasm of mistrust that has resulted in the political turmoil that engulfed most advanced economies in the last decade. Contrary to conventional wisdom, its causes derive more from perceived and actual political disenfranchisement than economic distress and inequality. Trends in the former suggest the wave is not near cresting, implying sustained socio-political, geopolitical and economic disruptions.

$Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere

FX herding cures “fear of floating”

The “co-prosperity sphere” of bloc managed exchange rates centered around Chinese trade and the US financial system, alternatively known as Bretton Woods II or Chimerica, dramatically reoriented global supply chains, supported emerging markets’ financial development and economic boom of the 2000s, drove much of the dollar’s 2002-’11 depreciation, and ultimately likely caused the Global Financial Crisis. Emerging market crises of the late 1990s marked the final chapter in the Bretton Woods exchange rate system. Yet “Fear of floating” persisted until China’s Mercantilism and contemporaneous accession to WTO provided an alternative: exchange rates managed by “herd” or by “pack”. Hiding within the herd provided financial stability for China’s EM trading partners, while simultaneously allowing them hunt as a pack for foreign direct investment and supply-chain dominance. The size and rapid growth of the co-prosperity sphere distorted the global economy like a massive stellar object warps space-time. Collective suppression of exchange rates and domestic cost of capital diverted supply chain growth into the bloc, while attendant reserve accumulation led to a surge in demand for “safe” core economy bonds. The former undermined returns to capital in traded goods production outside the bloc and the latter depressed interest rates on “safe” US debt, encouraging overinvestment in non-traded goods like housing. (Note: I labeled this phenomenon “the dollar bloc” when I first wrote about it in 2003-04, but later referred to it as “the co-prosperity sphere”.)

Mercantilism (with Chinese Characteristics)

State capitalism’s unintended costs

China’s 1994-2012 “miracle” that lifted nearly a billion people out of poverty and its current growth problems both originate in its extreme application of the mercantilist “Asian growth model” originated by Japan and later copied by Asia’s “Tigers”. A combination of capital controls, protectionism, domestic financial repression, and industrial policy direct underpriced capital to favored industries that promote rapid capital accumulation and development by leveraging external demand (and technology) from advanced economies. Rapid development and convergence comes at cost, however. Underpriced capital and exchange rates lead to distortive overinvestment. Those losses are realized either abruptly and painfully through write downs – like those enforced on late-‘90s Asian Crisis economies by the IMF – or, if the economy can self fund, are “amortized” as lost future growth. Japan’s lost decade and China’s current funk are examples of the amortization path of economic loss.

Apex neoliberalism

Liberal capital democracy’s pyrrhic victory

Rapid global growth, particularly in the less developed world, “hyperglobalized” production and the growth of inter-governmental coordination derive substantively from the triumph of neoliberalism that followed the collapse of its ideological competitors with the Soviet Union’s fall and emerging market crises of the 1990s. But so too did the seeds of its undoing: The Politics of Rage, Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics), Missingflation, and ultimately Global entropy. Rapid adoption of Western economic institutions and trade mechanisms followed from neoliberalism’s victory, promoting a world of hyperglobalization: ever-more dispersed but integrated global supply chains, just-in-time industrial processes with reduced redundancy, unfettered cross-border capital flows, and uniform rules that increased the influence of international institutions, non-governmental organizations and multinationals at the expense of local political control and less-skilled citizenry. Resultant uniformity and coincident digitization created a façade of certainty and quantification, promoting an overreliance on quantitative methods in decision processes, risk control and forecasting.

Economic and market phenomena:

Economic & market forecasts
  • The continued fall in US real rates through the 2000s and early 2010s. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the associated $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere undermined the marginal product of capital in the US while simultaneously increasing non-US demand for US Treasuries.
  • Emerging market outperformance in the 2000s. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) drove both the development of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere and the commodity supercycle, while Apex neoliberalism supported institutional reforms that lowered EM risk premia, all of which encouraged foreign direct investment that raised productivity and led to rapid economic growth.
  • The end of emerging markets’ “original sin” and growth of EM local bond markets, a development supported by a G7 initiative that I led at the US Treasury. Themes & framework: The $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere provided a new stability in many EM exchange rates while institutional reforms undertaken by many as part of Apex neoliberalism lowered EM risk premia.
  • The Global Financial Crisis (albeit see admission of errors below). Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere simultaneously increased incentives for debt finance in the US (as demand for “safe” USD bonds rose globally) while undermining US means of repayment as the US marginal product of capital in traded goods fell. Combined with poorly designed bank regulation that allowed banks to leverage themselves well beyond regulators’ intent (Apex neoliberalism), “complexity cascaded”.
  • The failure of QE to generate post-GFC inflation. Themes & framework: Believing is being: inflation expectations were stable to falling amid deleveraging and associated lethargic income growth, lowering real interest rates as nominal rates were pinned at the zero lower bound, and implying sustained weak money demand. Stuffing banks with more reserves changed none of those variables. As Keynes described seven decades earlier – in the absence of negative nominal rates – monetary policy at the zero lower bound is equivalent to “pushing on a string”.
  • The lack of effect of balance sheet runoff on interest rates. Themes & framework: Believing is being and portfolio theory rejected the then dominant “portfolio balance” theory of QE. QE was a credible commitment by central banks to keep rates on hold, suppressing expectations for future rates and thus the yield curve. This is why the “Taper Tantrum” had its largest effects on 3-5 year forward rates as expectations for rates hiked rose, while long-dated forward rates fell. Measures of long-dated term premia continued to fall as the Fed reduced its balance sheet.
  • Peak Chinese growth in 2011. Themes & framework: Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) led to unsustainable contributions of investment to GDP and a collapse in China’s marginal product of capital amid historically large debt to GDP, a phenomenon that peaked with China’s 50% surge in domestic credit in response to the GFC. Domestic funding of its debt trapped China within its own financial repression scheme, frustrating its efforts to unwind its $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere and internationalization the renminbi as a closed capital account is required to avoid savings flight and a collapse of the debt bubble. This self-funded debt bubble implies that losses from consequent overinvestment are “amortized” in the form of slower growth.
  • Emerging Market underperformance of the last decade (and likely future decade). Themes & framework: Institutional reform in EM peaked with US policy credibility before the GFC under Apex neoliberalism; China’s peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) in 2011 and the associated end of the commodity supercycle ended the “pack” economic benefits of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere, while simultaneously the advent of Localization began to shift production back to advanced economies. Amid stagnating growth and backsliding reforms, EM FX and asset prices looked (and continue to look) overvalued and risk spreads remain too thin.
  • Falling USD reserve share in the 2000s and a rising share since peak China. Themes & framework: The massive reserve accumulation required to sustain undervalution of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere came to be seen as “sovereign wealth” that required diversification, rather than a liquidity store for crises, and led to a consequent fall in the USD share of reserves. Yet the greater financial openness and cross-border claims that accompanied the Apex neoliberalism necessarily implied a proportional increase in capital outflows in periods of risk aversion; i.e. historically large reserves were not as large as perceived in reality. As China and the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere slowed after 2011, and Global entropy increased Uncertainty with attendant effects on risk aversion, emerging markets learned painfully in 2014 that reserves were neither excess nor sovereign wealth, but instead necessary liquidity, and that the USD’s safe haven properties were unparalleled.
  • Low and falling inflation throughout the 2010s. Themes & framework: Missingflation, the unexplained trend component of global inflation that had led to two decades of inflation overforecasting by economists, showed no signs of abating and seemed to be caused by a continued slide in inflation expectations (Believing is being) as central banks struggled with the zero lower bound. The end of the trend would require both for central banks to make more credible commitment to raise inflation in conjunction with a sustained positive inflation shock.
  • The (trend) bottoming of long-term US real rates, higher-than-expected peak in Fed funds rates and US equity outperformance in the last decade. Themes & framework: China’s peak in 2011 under Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the dissolution of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere ended the trend of falling US real rates they had created. But it wasn’t until Localization gathered sufficient steam – and the US private sector had deleveraged – that US openness and technological leadership sufficiently raised US returns to capital to support a rise in US real rates. The Trump administration’s political support (Politics of Rage) for Localization gave another nudge to US relative returns to capital, and Covid again accelerated these phenomena further (and likely more sustainably).
  • The capitulation of Saudi Arabia’s price leadership/management in 2014 in the face of surging US tight oil production leading to lower and more volatile crude oil prices. Themes & framework: The end of the commodity supercycle brought about by peak China under Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) paused relentless crude oil demand growth, allowing innovation and a business-friendly US regime to undermined Saudi Arabia’s price leadership with tight oil production. Cartel dynamics combined with Saudi Arabia’s long-run price maximization led to a collapse in Saudi-enforced OPEC discipline, and lower, more volatile crude oil prices.
  • Financial volatility’s shift to a lower median level with more frequent, shorter explosions during the last decade. Themes & framework: Rising Uncertainty in politics (Politics of Rage), geopolitics (Global entropy), technology (Localization), and policy (Missingflation) amid Complexity cascades shifted the relative shares of total risk away from quantifiable sources towards unquantifiable sources; the counter-intuitive implication of rising uncertainty is lower median volatility as active risk taking retreats in information lulls, with violent explosions of price activity when new information is revealed.
  • Persistence of post-Covid supply constraints and sustainable inflation supported by rearview-mirror central bank policies leading to a flip in the direction of Missingflation. Themes & framework: Covid simultaneously accelerated both the economic and political motivations for Localization, caused a permanent shift in the structure of global demand, and disrupted existing global supply chains. Short-run aggregate supply could not adjust to the jump in investment and shift in demand quickly enough, creating prolonged shortages and the need for prices to curtail demand. The associated cost-push inflation was all the spark needed to ignite Believing is being changes in inflation expectation driven by central banks’ backward-looking policies based on a lack of understanding of Missingflation.
  • The Fed’s post-Covid rate cycle would be more like 1994 than the post-2000 gradualist cycles (a call I made in early 2021). Themes & framework: The intent of the Fed’s FAIT policy always was to boost long-run inflation expectations by falling “behind the curve” on inflation. Yet their lack of understanding of the causes of Missingflation and insufficient faith in their own ability to generate Believing is being kept them focused on “fighting the last war” too long, allowing inflation to run too hot, too quickly. But contrary to market conventional wisdom, inflation is deeply politically unpopular in an aging society and no central banker wants to be remembered as failing to control inflation. Accordingly, the Fed (eventually) will react forcefully to contain the Believing is being genie they underestimated.
  • Consistent underperformance of European economy, assets and the euro since the Global Financial Crisis. Themes & framework: Relative to trend growth, Europe was more highly indebted than the US, yet European policymakers too long considered the GFC an “American problem”. Combined with Europe’s greater institutional rigidities and a reluctance to write down bad assets, it would take proportionately longer to achieve necessary deleveraging. China’s 2011 peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the rise of Localization undermined all parts of Europe: the globalization-dependent South and China-dependent North, while inflexibility and low levels of technological innovation inhibit Europe’s ability to adjust to the new global economic order.
  • UK outperformance of consensus Brexit forecasts. Themes & framework: Consensus forecast for post-Brexit UK were based on three flawed assumptions (due to underappreciation of themes!). First, by ignoring emergent Localization, growth forecasts grounded in Apex neoliberalism wrongly assumed globalization would continue to be a major driver of economic growth. Second, the consensus failed to acknowledge the UK’s long-run structural competitiveness: world-leading universities providing a technological edge in Localization; and strong, enduring institutions offering safety and stability amid Global entropy and rising Uncertainty. Third, the consensus, ironically, ignored the largest driver of trade (by a wide margin) in their own models: “gravity”, or proximity to trading partners. Network effects are extraordinarily powerful in trade and difficult to overcome.
  • Importance and implications for markets of Scottish independence referendum in 2014. Themes & framework: As one of the earliest manifestations of the Politics of Rage and its demands for greater political representation, the Scottish referendum was an unanticipated shock to markets and one of the first signs of Global entropy and the Uncertainty to come.

Foreign exchange forecasts:

Foreign exchange forecasts
  • The dollar’s trend fall 2002-’11. Themes & framework: The effects of the $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere on relative returns to capital, balance of payments and the effects of “diversification” as sovereign reserves evolved into sovereign wealth.

  • The dollar’s trend turn in 2011, surge 2014-2016, and counter-consensus strength in 2018 and 2021 (I was the only sell-side analyst to forecast USD strength in 2021). Themes & framework: The same forces driving the US real rates higher in the last several years – the end of Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and its associated $Bloc/Chinese co-prosperity sphere, disproportionate benefit to the US from accelerating Localization, Global entropy and Complexity cascades, all played out in the USD, too, with added support from increased safe haven demand for the greenback due to rising Uncertainty brought about by Global entropy and Complexity cascades.

  • The euro’s plunge from $1.36 in mid 2014 to $1.05 in early 2015. Themes & framework: Reluctant deleveraging from the Global Financial Crisis combined with the sharp deterioration in European returns to capital following China’s peak within Mercantilism (with Chinese characteristics) and the shift to Localization from globalization implied a sharply lower real value of the euro. When ECB President Draghi ruled out the deflationary (1990s Japan) path to devaluation with his commitment to “whatever it takes”, Believing is being implied an immediate and massive change in the nominal value of the euro was required as the expected path for domestic prices flipped.

  • The yen’s surge from above 120 per dollar to below 105 in H1 2016. Themes & framework: Abenomics’ biggest success was its Believing is being commitment to reflate Japan’s economy, leading to a sharp depreciation of the nominal yen as expected future deflation was unwound. But yen depreciation included an “overshoot” to compensate for the risks that inflation might overshoot. The Bank of Japan’s tacit admission that “Quantitative & Qualitative Easing” could not create sufficient inflation with its December 2015 adoption of negative interest rates implied a rapid unwind of the overshoot given the yen’s deep undervaluation as beliefs shifted again.

  • The pound sterling’s pre-EU referendum fall to $1.40, post-referendum floor near $1.20, and its post-Brexit rebound above $1.30. Themes & framework: A steep risk premium in sterling was required to compensate for the Uncertainty induced by the Politics of Rage driven jolt. Yet, 1.20 represented a 60+ year low in purchasing power parity and seemed to undervalue the UK’s long-run structural assets – strong institutions, top global universities, leading tech industry – all of which were appreciating in value in a world of Localization, Global entropy, broader Uncertainty, and rising potential for Complexity cascades.

Political forecasts:

  • Political instability in Russia and China in 2023: Clash of the Themes.

  • Brexit 2016. Themes & framework: The chasm between elites (including those in markets) and ordinary citizens over the latter’s sense of disenfranchisement, the fundamental cause of the Politics of Rage, was clear well before the referendum and strongly suggested that bias in polling turnout models could fully account for the polls’ projected margin of defeat.

  • Trump 2016. Themes & framework: Record pre-election postal votes from registered independents (for whom no party seeks to “get out the vote”) suggested that, as with Brexit, the Politics of Rage’s disenfranchised and unaccounted for voters would be sufficient to overcome the (narrow) projected margin of loss.

  • Marine Le Pen’s 2017 success in reaching the run-off but ultimate failure to win French presidency. Themes & framework: The Politics of Rage framework suggested an undercounting of both Le Pen and left-wing populists’ support, giving her a clear path to the second round. But her projected margin of loss in the general election was far too large to be due solely to turnout bias, implying no chance of second-round success, particularly with left-wing populist voters dropping out or shifting support to Macron.

  • Trump narrow loss, post-election conflict 2020. Themes & framework: Pollsters’ mistaken focus on education levels as the source of their 2016 turnout errors rather than on (mis)trust driven by the Politics of Rage implied polls still were biased. Large shifts in minority voters towards Trump and unusually high “undecided” voters late in a highly polarized election also suggested the magnitude of Trump’s outperformance would be large (indeed, it was larger than 2016). But the margin to overcome also was much wider in 2020, suggesting a close loss by Trump. Increasing polarization and mistrust on both sides implied a violent reaction by a minority, whichever side lost.

Admission of errors:

I get things wrong, too, but hopefully am the wiser for it. This list is far from complete, but represents some of the ones that both stung and taught me the most.

  • Failing to specify financial institutions as at risk from credit trauma in 2023. While I did highlight that the most predictable source of for 2023 would be credit events following the massive rise in interest rates in 2022 (Debt reality versus perceptions), I didn’t specifically identify banks and other financial institutions as especially vulnerable, which proved to be the case with the failure of a few regional US banks in March 2023. Lessons learnt: Sometimes one’s focus on the underlying causes blinds to the obvious consequences, and levered entities with broad exposure will always be at risk from any traumas within an economy, even if sector or region specific.

  • Not seeing the Global Financial Crisis sooner. I saw the GFC earlier than many, but the extent of the financial system’s capital shortfall eluded me far longer than it should have. At the US Treasury from 2006 through early 2008 I was responsible for assessing foreign financial risks (sadly, institutional territorialism prevented an integrated approach with my domestic-side colleagues that may have focused more attention on off-balance-sheet financing of US housing). I chaired meeting after meeting in 2006-‘07 with market professionals, academics, regulators, and other policymakers where a noisy minority of participants argued that historic levels of debt to GDP implied an impending crisis. Yet when I challenged them to explain a channel of transmission, what would be the tipping point, why it had not occurred already, or to present evidence that bank capital was insufficient to absorb even an historic drop in US housing prices, none – including some who have become very famous for “calling” the GFC – could do so. Ultimately, it was the behavior of banks in funding markets in mid-to-late 2007 that clued me in that banks’ capital bases might not be what they purported (or, equivalently, contingent liabilities off balance sheet were far larger than people understood). What I had not done – nor, apparently had any of the “experts” I consulted in those years – was the detailed micro-level analysis that the protagonists of The Big Short had done (kudos to them). Lessons learnt: 1. “Macro” analysis often requires “micro foundations”; 2. many people claim expertise, don’t rely on it without evidence; and 3. notwithstanding (2), even if they can’t explain it, pay attention when a gathering minority claim to smell smoke. (Implicit lesson 4: don’t assume that the left hand is talking to the right hand in any organization.)

  • Losing my nerve at the bottom of markets in 2009. My framework helped me to correctly call the bottom in credit markets in January 2009 and recommend to the distressed debt fund I then worked for that we aggressively buy leveraged loans. But on market research mission in late February, I got spooked by US Treasury and Fed officials I met in New York and Washington. Throwing my framework out the window, on 6 March 2009, the exact day the S&P 500 hit its 666 low, I wrote a memo urging the fund to sell SPX futures as a hedge on its market exposure. Lessons learnt: 1. Never abandon your framework; and 2. don’t assume someone’s position or pedigree alone gives them an informational or analytical advantage: demand reasons and evidence.

  • Missing the euro’s partial rebound in 2017; indeed, I forecast it lower! I failed to acknowledge the extent of the uptick in economic activity, and importantly, the credit growth that the ECB’s “anything it takes” policy was generating. This one stung as I was a strong believer in then-President Mario Draghi’s approach and had previously highlighted credit expansion as a key metric of success. Lessons learnt: Keep your eyes on the ball and regularly check to see if any of the ex ante conditions established for changing your mind have been met.

  • Dollar weakness in summer 2020. Another one that really stings. Having correctly forecast that Covid-induced Uncertainty would lead to a surge in the USD as everyone scrambled for high-quality assets and liquidity in March-April 2020, I then failed to incorporate the unwind of that flight to quality as risk tolerance returned once the panic subsided. Lesson learnt: Sadly, the same as 2017 dollar lesson: Keep your eyes on the ball and mind your pre-established conditions for turning points.

  • I completely missed the Fed’s mini easing cycle in 2019. While we will never know and Covid eviscerated my chance at redemption, I still believe the Fed’s easing was not merited and likely would have necessitated more aggressive hiking later had the Covid crisis not intervened. The US economy continued to grow strongly in 2019, investment held up, and while headline inflation moderated somewhat, bottlenecks were generating rapid acceleration in a number of CPI subcomponents. But even if I was right on the economy, the FOMC sets policy and I failed to listen to them, particularly the increasing support for average inflation targeting. Lessons learnt: Policymakers set policy, listen to them even if you think they’re wrong.

  • Underestimating Jeremy Corbyn in the 2017 UK general election. I expected a small Conservative victory based on then Prime Minister Theresa May’s outreach to the working class and the Labour Party’s anti-Brexit tone. What I failed to notice was that Mr. Corbyn’s grass-roots campaign cleverly focused on local bread-and-butter issues and greater political devolution, directly addressing one of the primary drivers of the Politics of Rage: a widening sense of political disenfranchisement among the average citizenry. Corbyn’s tangible policies and outreach – which he largely abandoned in his losing 2019 campaign – easily trumped Ms. May’s intangible rhetoric as “hidden” Brexit voters didn’t trust her. Lessons learnt: Again, “macro” analysis needs “micro foundations”, particularly in politics; ignore at your own peril.

  • Texas Governor Rick Perry to win the 2012 Republican nomination and beat President Barack Obama in the general election. The foundations of the Politics of Rage were already well apparent by the 2012 election and Rick Perry’s campaign was well tuned to court the rising sense of disenfranchisement of working-class voters, particularly in Appalachia, and increasing distrust of institutional expertise across voters. Many of those voters were Democrats who were disappointed with the lack of “Hope and Change” promised by President Obama, making him vulnerable to any Republican who could attract a significant number of Democratic voters. Governor Perry’s bigger challenge appeared to be winning the Republican nomination, but his solid conservative credentials and popularity in the second-largest state suggested he would eek it out. Who knew he would self-immolate in a nationally televised debate? Lessons learnt: Themes are important – Trump proved the Politics of Rage four years later – but idiosyncratic risks always are present.